Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In the summer of 2010, SD and DJ attended the Rock Solid Camp, a Shreveport day camp providing sports and other activities to children of varying ages. SD was an eight-year-old special education student with a mild case of Cornelia de Lange Syndrome (“CdLS”). At that time, fourteen-year-old DJ was on probation for aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen in Texas and had been accused of a sexual assault in March 2010 at Northwest Regional Mental Health Center, where he had been receiving counseling. As a juvenile on probation, DJ was eligible for State-provided services. DJ’s case coordinator at the Shreveport region Office of Behavioral Health (“OBH”), an arm of the State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals (“DHH”), approved the funding for DJ to attend Rock Solid Camp, and the State of Louisiana paid his camp tuition. Jared Green, a camp counselor, gave SD permission to use the men’s restroom. When SD took longer than expected to return, Mr. Green went into the restroom and discovered SD and DJ in a shower stall pulling up their pants. Camp officials reported the incident to the Shreveport Police Department, which conducted an investigation. SD was examined by a hospital sexual assault nurse examiner, but no physical injuries were noted. SD gave a taped video statement indicating that DJ anally raped him. DJ was arrested for aggravated rape and adjudicated delinquent. CD, individually and as tutor of his son SD, filed a petition for damages, naming as defendants, SC (mother of DJ); Rock Solid Camps, LLC; and the State of Louisiana, through DHH. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to consider whether the court of appeal erred by reducing the general damages awarded to SD, the minor victim of a sexual assault. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found the jury did not abuse its discretion in assessing the amount of general damages, and the court of appeal erred in holding otherwise. The trial court’s award of general damages was reinstated in accord with jury’s verdict. In all other respects, the court of appeal’s judgment was affirmed. View "C.D. v. S.C., et al." on Justia Law

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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The questions related to claims made by Kirk Menard, who worked as an environmental, safety, and health specialist at Targa Resources, LLC’s Venice, Louisiana plant. His job duties included ensuring Targa complied with various state and federal environmental and safety standards. Menard reported to two individuals: his “official supervisor,” David Smith, who resided at another facility, and an “indirect supervisor,” Ted Keller, who served as an area manager for the Venice plant. Menard’s indirect supervisor, in turn, reported to Perry Berthelot, a Targa District Manager. In a conference call, Menard reported that the total suspended solids in certain recent water samples exceeded regulatory limits. At the end of the call, Berthelot told Menard to call him back to discuss the plan for rectifying these exceedances. Menard obliged, and he alleged Berthelot told him he should dilute the sewage samples with bottled water. Menard claimed that in response he nervously laughed and said, “no, we’re going to correct it the right way.” The federal appellate court asked the Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) whether refusals to engage in illegal or environmentally damaging activities were “disclosures” under the current version of the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Statute ("LEWS"); and (2) whether LEWS afforded protection to an employee who reports to his supervisor an activity, policy, or practice of an employer which he reasonably believes is in violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation, where reporting violations of environmental law, rules, or regulations, is a part of the employee’s normal job responsibilities. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative to both questions. View "Menard v. Targa Resources, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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Defendants, the Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc. and Holy Cross College, Inc. (collectively “Holy Cross”), challenged the constitutionality of 2021 La. Acts 322, §2 (“Act 322”), an enactment of the Louisiana legislature that amended La. R.S. 9:2800.9 and revived prescribed child sex abuse claims for a limited three-year period (sometimes referred to as “revival provision”). Plaintiff T.S. directly appealed the trial court’s judgment sustaining Holy Cross’s exception of prescription. In sustaining the exception, the trial court found the matter could not be resolved on non-constitutional grounds and declared Act 322, §2 unconstitutional, reasoning that the legislature lacked authority to revive a prescribed claim. After reviewing the record, along with the pertinent legislation, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in finding Act 322 unconstitutional when this matter could be resolved on non-constitutional, statutory grounds. Nevertheless, the Court found the trial court was correct in granting the exception of prescription. View "T.S. v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, the surviving parents of their deceased daughter, brought an action to nullify their daughter’s marriage to defendant, Eden Kol, based upon the allegation that their daughter and defendant entered into the marriage for the sole purpose of evading federal immigration laws to obtain permanent resident status for defendant. Defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, alleging the petition failed to state a cause of action for nullification of marriage under the Louisiana Civil Code. The trial court granted the exception, and the court of appeal affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Wederstrandt v. Kol" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was a matter of first impression: whether a defendant who is charged with first degree murder can elect a bench trial when the state has filed a formal notice that it will not seek capital punishment. The question presented involved the interpretation of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 780, specifically the meaning of the phrase “an offense other than one punishable by death.” In February 2021, defendant John Shallerhorn was arrested for several offenses, including on suspicion of first degree murder. The state filed notice that “for any charges for which the grand jury returns an indictment in [this] case, the State will elect to forego capital punishment.” Shallerhorn was ultimately indicted for first degree murder and armed robbery. Defendant filed a motion for a bench trial, seeking to waive his right to a trial by jury pursuant to the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. article 780. The state opposed this motion, and the trial court, agreeing with the state, denied it. The trial court noted that though the state was not currently pursuing the death penalty, “if something changes at the DA’s office and somehow death is back on the table,” then the defendant could not waive a jury and elect a bench trial. The Supreme Court held that after the state provides formal notice that it will not seek the death penalty, and thereby elects to prosecute the offense of first degree murder as a non-capital case, a defendant may waive a trial by jury and elect a bench trial. View "Louisiana v. Shallerhorn" on Justia Law

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The putative biological father sought to rebut, pursuant to La. C.C. art. 198, a presumption set forth in La. C.C. art. 185, despite having filed his avowal petition more than one year after the birth of the child and even though no “bad faith” was found on the part of the mother. After years of litigation on preliminary issues, the appellate court reviewed an earlier district court ruling, which found that La. C.C. art. 198 was not unconstitutional, and reversed the district court, concluding Article 198 was unconstitutional as applied. On review, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under the facts presented here, that the putative biological father had no fundamental constitutional right to parent a child born to a mother, who was married to and living with another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court, reinstated the district court judgment holding that La. C.C. art. 198 was constitutional, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law

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Defendant Marshall Alexander, Jr. was found guilty as charged of the second degree murder of Scott Latiolais. On March 29, 2002, Latiolais’s body was found in a field in St. Martin Parish. He was killed by a shotgun wound to the back. It was the State’s theory, which was evidently accepted by the jury, that defendant and his cousin, Timothy Roberts, intended to rob the victim, who was then shot in the back when he tried to flee. The State’s own case predominantly established Roberts’s guilt while the evidence against defendant, cobbled together from inconsistent statements and testimony, was minimal. The court of appeal found the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant shot the victim or that defendant knew his cousin had intended to rob the victim before he shot him. To this, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, and affirmed the appellate court's decision which reversed defendant's conviction. View "Lousiana v. Alexander" on Justia Law

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This matter arose from Wilbert Jones’ suit for compensation under La. R.S. 15:572.8 (“Wrongful Conviction Compensation Statute”). Jones was indicted for the rape of A.H. on April 3, 1972. At trial, he testified that he did not rape A.H. and that he participated in a lineup because he was certain of his innocence. Despite earlier equivocations, A.H. testified that Jones was her assailant. In 2011, Jones filed a petition for post-conviction relief seeking DNA testing. He also presented additional evidence of similarities between A.H.’s rape and one committed by Arnold Ray O’Conner. A trial court ruled the State had committed a Brady violation, observing the near-identical modus operandi of the rape of O’Conner’s victim and that of A.H. The State ultimately dismissed the indictment against Jones and he was released from prison after nearly fifty years of confinement. Jones subsequently filed a petition for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment relying on the factual findings of district court Judge Anderson and testimony by Dr. Margaret Kovera, an expert in eyewitness identification. Conducting a de novo review of the record, the court of appeal found Jones met his burden and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the amount of compensation due. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no error in the court of appeal's determination, and affirmed its judgment. View "Jones v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State's petition for review to determine whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the district court's denial of post-conviction relief. The court of appeal found trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms when a prospective juror was not challenged for cause for her employment with the district attorney. The court of appeal also found respondent suffered prejudice when that juror, initially an alternate, was then seated on the jury. The Supreme Court pretermitted the question of counsel’s deficient performance or error, finding legal error in the court of appeal’s prejudice determination under the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). "Here, the record does not establish prejudice. The verdict is neither unreliable nor would it have likely been different absent the alleged error. The court of appeal ruling is reversed and the ruling of the district court denying respondent’s application for post-conviction relief is reinstated." View "Louisiana v. Chandler" on Justia Law

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The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the continuing validity of the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity, adopted in Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944 (1996). This case presented the issue of whether Louisiana law recognized a cause of action for claims asserted against an assistant district attorney (“ADA”), who, during the plea and sentencing phase of a prosecution, misrepresents, either directly or by omission, a victim’s preference as to the sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, and thereafter, attempts to conceal this alleged misconduct. A secondary question concerned whether a cause of action could be maintained against the district attorney (“DA”) who employed the ADA, under a theory of vicarious liability or for employment-related claims. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Knapper and further found that, under the circumstances of this case, both the ADA and the DA were entitled to immunity. The Court thus found that the lower courts erred in overruling the defendants’ peremptory exception of no cause of action. View "Jameson v. Montgomery, et al." on Justia Law