Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a tax exclusion, La. R.S. 47:301(14)(g)(i)(bb), which provided exclusions from state and local sales tax of charges for repairs on certain property that was delivered to customers out of state. At the local tax level, the 2013 version of this tax exclusion was mandatory for tax authorities in East Feliciana Parish and optional for all other parishes, municipalities and school boards. The question presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was, when the legislature enacted a tax exclusion, whether La. Const. art. VI, section 29(D)(1) required the legislature to treat tax authorities in all parishes the same or to make tax authorities in all parishes act the same. The Supreme Court held that the uniformity provision of the constitution, based on its plain and unambiguous meaning, required that a legislative tax exclusion treat tax authorities in all parishes the same. The Court found La. R.S. 47:301(14)(g)(i)(bb), as amended in 2013, to be unconstitutional because tax authorities in all parishes are not required to apply the tax exclusion in the same form, manner, or degree. "However, the portion of this statutory provision-mandating tax authorities in East Feliciana Parish apply the exclusion-is severable from the rest." Therefore, the Court severed this portion, leaving the balance of the statutory provision unchanged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court ruling and remanded this matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arrow Aviation Co., LLC. v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Taylor was charged with possession with intent to distribute (“PWITD”) cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The state sought to introduce evidence of defendant’s three alleged prior convictions at trial: one PWITD cocaine and two for possession of cocaine. In accordance with Louisiana Code of Evidence article 404(B)(1) and "Louisiana v. Prieur," (277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973)), the state filed two notices of intent to introduce such evidence, attaching the three police reports associated with these prior incidents to satisfy its burden of proof. The district court issued rulings allowing the state to introduce the other crimes evidence and the court of appeal denied defendant’s writ applications. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s two writ applications to address the correctness of the district court’s rulings and to re-examine the requirements and procedure for introduction of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” evidence at trial. The Court affirmed the ruling of the district court relative to the admissibility of defendant’s prior PWITD cocaine conviction. However, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling relative to the admissibility of defendant’s prior two convictions for possession of cocaine and remanded this matter back to the district court to conduct a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of this evidence. View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodricus Crawford was indicted by grand jury for the first-degree murder of his one-year-old son, committed while engaged in the perpetration of cruelty to juveniles and second degree cruelty to juveniles and while the victim was under twelve years of age. Following the close of evidence, a jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged and, after the penalty phase of the trial, recommended the death sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to death in accordance with that recommendation. Defendant raised twenty-three alleged errors at trial as grounds to reverse the sentence; the Supreme Court found merit in only one: error relating to his “Batson challenge.” Defendant’s conviction and sentence were therefore vacated, and this matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Crawford" on Justia Law

At the center of this appeal was a district court judgment declaring La. Child. Code art. 609 unconstitutional. La. Child. Code art. 609 required any statutorily defined “mandatory reporter” of child abuse “who has cause to believe that a child’s physical or mental health or welfare is endangered as a result of abuse,” to report the suspected abuse irrespective of “any claim of privilege.” Specifically, this case raised the issue of whether a priest was a “mandatory reporter,” as defined in La. Child. Code art. 603, when administering the Sacrament of Penance (“confession”), such that the provisions of La. Child. Code art. 609 would require him to report information learned during a sacramental confession. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the issue here was one of statutory interpretation and should have been resolved on statutory grounds. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's declaration of unconstitutionality as premature and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mayeux v. Charlet" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert McCoy was indicted by grand jury on three counts of first degree murder for the murders of Willie Ray Young, Christine Colston Young, and Gregory Lee Colston. After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged on all three counts. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death, in accordance with the jury’s determination. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, raising sixteen assignments of error. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. View "Louisiana v. McCoy" on Justia Law

In 2012, the sentencing provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.1 were replaced with new ones addressing sentencing. After numerous delays, defendant Sean Holloway was convicted and sentenced in 2014 for an offense committed in 2007. The offense occurred in 2007 prior to the legislative changes; the conviction and sentencing occurred following the effective date of those changes. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine which version of La.C.Cr.P. art. 890.1 applied to the defendant’s sentence: the version in effect at the time of the offense, or the version in effect at the time of sentencing. After review of the language of the replacement article, which plainly stated that it applied “upon conviction, in sentencing the offender,” the Court found that it was the revised version of La. C.Cr.P. art. 890.1, effective May 17, 2012, that applied to defendant’s 2014 conviction and sentence, rather than the former version, in effect at the time of the offense. Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal which vacated the designation of the defendant’s conviction as a crime of violence. View "Louisiana v. Holloway" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Alden Morgan, committed armed robbery at age 17. Following return of the guilty verdict, the district court sentenced him to 99 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. After being denied relief on direct review, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in light of recent developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to the sentencing of juveniles. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the defendant’s writ application to determine whether the defendant’s 99-year sentence was an effective life sentence and was, therefore, illegal under the Supreme Court’s decision in "Graham v. Florida," (560 U.S. 48 (2010)). The Louisiana Court held that a 99-year sentence without parole was illegal because it did not provide the defendant “with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Accordingly, the Court amended defendant’s sentence to delete the restriction on parole eligibility. View "State ex rel Moran v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Claimant Richard Borja, was employed by St. Bernard Parish Government (“St. Bernard”) as a firefighter. In March of 2004, claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation alleging that he had injured his right knee and right thumb in an accident in 2002, and he also alleged he had an occupational disease. He described his injuries on the 2004 disputed claim for compensation as a “torqued knee” and “Heart and Lung,” indirectly referencing the Fireman’s Heart and Lung Act. After the accident, the claimant began receiving maximum workers’ compensation benefits, which continued until St. Bernard terminated them one year later. In the meantime, claimant had taken disability retirement in January 2003. The disputed claim form was filed within one year of the termination of the benefits. St. Bernard ultimately admitted that claimant had sustained an injury to his right knee, but disputed any thumb injury as well as any heart and lung claims as being related to his employment, stating that it did not know about the injuries, or that alternatively, they were prescribed. While St. Bernard conceded the claimant had been receiving the maximum benefits from the date of the accident until January 2003, it also maintained that because the claimant voluntarily retired in that month, he had removed himself from the workforce and was no longer entitled to future workers’ compensation benefits. Throughout the 2004 litigation, claimant had consistently argued that his heart and lung conditions were related to his employment. The dispute eventually went to mediation, which resulted in a compromise that claimant would receive back compensation payments in two lump sums, bringing him current to 2008, and that he would receive weekly indemnity benefits which were the maximum claimant could receive at that time. By October 2008, claimant moved dismiss the 2004 litigation noting “that this matter has been settled in full.” By 2013, St. Bernard, identifying the claimant’s benefits as Supplemental Earnings Benefits (“SEBs”), gave notice that it would terminate SEBs effective August 27, 2013, on the basis that he would have received the full 520 weeks of payments. In November 2013, claimant filed another disputed claim for compensation citing “knees, heart and lung” as his injuries. Specifically, he described his 2002 injury to the knee. St. Bernard filed exceptions of prescription and res judicata. A workers’ compensation judge granted the exception of res judicata for the knee injury, and granted the exception of prescription as to the claim under the “Heart and Lung Statute.” On appeal, a majority of the court of appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. After its review, the Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the claimant’s request for medical benefits under the heart and lung statute had prescribed because claimant timely filed his 2013 disputed claim asserting permanent and total disability as a result of his heart and lung condition. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment affirming the workers’ compensation judge’s rulings sustaining the exception of prescription and the exception of res judicata. View "Borja v. Fara St. Bernard Parish Gov't" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was a res nova issue of whether a claim for negligent credentialing fell within the purview of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA) and was, therefore, subject to its statutory cap on damages. After completion of the medical review process, plaintiffs Brandi, Veronica, and Joseph Billeaudeau proceeded in their suit against Opelousas General Hospital Authority (OGH), among other defendants, for injuries Brandi sustained allegedly arising from the medical malpractice of Dr. Kondilo Skirlis-Zavala, an independent contractor working in the OGH’s emergency department (ED). Along with their medical malpractice claims, plaintiffs specifically alleged OGH was negligent in credentialing Dr. Zavala and subsequently moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a determination that their negligent credentialing claim was not subject to the LMMA’s cap on damages. The District Court granted the motion and ultimately certified the judgment as final. The Court of Appeal affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ negligent credentialing claim did not fall within the provisions of the LMMA. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeal. View "Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff, James Duhon, was such a customer, and was injured in the course of participating in the park’s activities. After plaintiff filed suit seeking damages, Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception, but the court of appeal reversed, finding the arbitration provision should be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. View "Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law