Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff Theresa Alicea executed the Agreement prior to her husband, Roger Alicea, taking their minor sons to Sky Zone. The Aliceas’ son, Logan, was injured while jumping on a trampoline. The Aliceas filed suit against Sky Zone, individually and on behalf of Logan. Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception and the court of appeal denied Sky Zone’s writ application. After review, the Supreme Court held the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Alicea v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law

Johnny Lee Harris was charged with the 2009 attempted armed robbery of Wayne Duplechain. He pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. During voir dire, the state opposed defense counsel’s exercise of peremptory challenge to strike three jurors, who all were white females. The jury found Harris guilty as charged of attempted armed robbery and the district court sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment at hard labor. A majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals rejected Harris’s claim that the trial court erred by granting the state’s “reverse-Batson” challenges regarding two of the three jurors, using "Louisiana v. Nelson," (85 So.3d 21 (La. 3/13/12)), as grounds for its ruling. The Supreme Court, however, found that the appellate dissent's assessment of the law and application was correct. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in its handling of the state's "reverse-Batson" challenge, and therefore, the conviction and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Brandy Fecke, and her parents Stephen and Karen Fecke, and the defendant, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (“LSU Board”), sought review of the court of appeal’s judgment. In 2008, Brandy, a 23-year-old, senior at LSU, went to an indoor rock climbing facility located at the LSU Recreation Center (“Rec Center”) to fulfill a compulsory rock climbing assignment for an Outdoor Living Skills Activity course. Upon arrival, Brandy executed the “Rock Wall Participation Agreement” required by LSU. After instruction and a climbing demonstration by the Rec Center employees, Brandy successfully climbed the wall. While descending, however, she fell, landing on her left foot and fractured the talus bone in her ankle. As a result of the injury, Brandy underwent three surgeries and required additional surgery, including either a permanent ankle fusion or ankle replacement. The Feckes filed a petition for damages against the LSU Board. Following a trial, the jury found the LSU Board 75% and Brandy 25% at fault, and awarded Brandy total damages of $1,925,392.72, and Karen Fecke $50,000.00 for loss of consortium. The LSU Board appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed in part, amended in part, and affirmed as amended the trial court judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to interpret specific provisions within the Louisiana Governmental Claims Act, including La. Rev. Stat. 39:1533.22, and to resolve three issues: (1) whether plaintiff was entitled to legal interest on an award for future medical care paid directly to the health care provider from the Future Medical Care Fund (“FMCF”); (2) whether plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs from an award for future medical care prior to its placement into the FMCF; and (3) whether plaintiff, who was unemployed at the time of the injury, was entitled to recover the loss of future earnings. After review, the Supreme Court held: a plaintiff who is awarded future medical care pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 13:5106(B)(3)(c) was not entitled to legal interest on the award and could not recover attorney’s fees or costs from the award prior to its placement into the FMCF. Furthermore, the Court held that a plaintiff who was unemployed at the time of the injury could recover the loss of future earnings, as defined in La. Rev. Stat. 13:5106(D)(2). View "Fecke v. Bd. of Supervisors Louisiana St. Univ. & Agricultural & Mech. College" on Justia Law

Defendant Marcus Reed appealed after being convicted for the murders of three unarmed young brothers. Reed received the death penalty. On direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, Reed raised fifty alleged errors as grounds to overturn his convictions and sentence. After a "thorough" review of the record, the law, and the evidence, the Supreme Court found no reversible error. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant’s first-degree murder convictions and the imposition of the death sentence. View "Louisiana v. Reed" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the duty to defend in long latency disease cases could be prorated between an insurer and its insured when occurrence-based policies provide coverage for only a portion of the time during which exposure occurred. In the underlying Arceneaux suit, plaintiffs alleged that they suffered hearing loss from exposure to unreasonably loud noise in the course of their work at American Sugar’s refinery in Arabi, Louisiana. Two sets of plaintiffs, the Barbe plaintiffs and the Waguespack plaintiffs, filed suit against American Sugar in 2006. These suits were consolidated with the Arceneaux action, which was filed in 1999 against American Sugar’s predecessor, Tate & Lyle North American Sugars, Inc. This opinion concerned only the Barbe and Waguespack plaintiffs, and not the Arceneaux plaintiffs whose claims had been litigated extensively in the trial court, the court of appeal, and the Louisiana Supreme Court. Continental Casualty Company argued that defense costs should have been prorated among insurers and the insured if there were periods of non-coverage. American Sugar Refining, Inc. claimed that the duty to defend as agreed upon in the policy provided for a complete defense so long as the duty to defend attached, even if some claims fell outside of coverage. The Supreme Court held that the duty to defend should have been prorated in this case based upon policy language. View "Arceneaux v Amstar Corp." on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) brought a formal charge against Judge J. Robin Free of the 18th Judicial District Court for the Parishes of Iberville, Pointe Coupee and West Baton Rouge. The charge alleged Judge Free violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Louisiana Constitution, Article V, sec. 25(C), in that he interrupted a private meeting between the family members of the victims and members of the District Attorney’s Office, following a hearing in a criminal case before him, and made an inappropriate comment; abused his contempt authority and failed to follow the proper procedures for the punishment of contempt in two cases; and made inappropriate comments in seven criminal cases and exhibited a lack of proper decorum, demeanor, and temperament. After reviewing the recommendation of the Commission and the record, the Louisiana Supreme Court accepted the recommendation of the Commission that Judge Free be suspended without pay for one year and ordered to reimburse the Commission for the costs associated with these proceedings. View "In re Judge J. Robin Free, Eighteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., Parishes of West Baton Rouge, Iberville & Pointe Coupee" on Justia Law

In March 2014, the state charged defendant Dominick Sims by bill of information with one felony count of trafficking of children for sexual purposes, in violation of R.S. 14:46.3. During the course of pretrial proceedings, defendant filed a motion to quash, challenging the constitutionality of R.S. 14:46.3. The trial court ruled the statute unconstitutional, but after review, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, specifically finding that the provisions of R.S. 14:46.3(C)(2) were clear and unambiguous and did not conflict with R.S. 14:46.3(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. Sims" on Justia Law

Both of the injured employees in these cases, Charles Morris and Charles Poole, were treated at the Lafayette Bone & Joint Clinic (“LB&J”); Morris was treated by Dr. Louis Blanda and Poole by Dr. John Cobb. Louisiana United Business SIF (“LUBA”), sent letters to LB&J and its doctors stating that LUBA would no longer pay for prescription medications directly dispensed by LB&J and directing LB&J doctors to issue future prescriptions for the instant injured employees that could be filled at local retail pharmacies. Despite these notices and subsequent denials of requests for reimbursement of dispensed prescription medications, LB&J doctors continued to dispense prescription medications to these injured employee patients throughout 2008 and to submit requests for reimbursement to LUBA. LUBA declined payment for these requests, citing its prior notice. LB&J and the treating physicians thereafter filed disputed claim forms with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC), seeking to recover the cost of the medications dispensed, along with penalties and attorney fees. Following a joint trial in these two cases, the OWC judge ruled that the plaintiff/health care providers’ recovery for medications dispensed after the 2008 notice were nonemergency treatment dispensed without consent of the payor. Further, the OWC judge found that no penalties or attorney fees were warranted because LUBA had clearly advised the plaintiff/health care providers that no further reimbursement would be made for prescription medications dispensed by LB&J doctors after the date of the notice. The plaintiff/health care providers appealed, seeking an increase in the amount awarded and an award of penalties and attorney fees. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to review the appellate court decisions, which awarded unreimbursed prescription medication costs beyond the $750 limitation set forth in LSA-R.S. 23:1142(B) and awarded penalties and attorney fees. The Court reversed the appellate court's modification of the amount awarded by the OWC, and affirmed in part, the decision to award penalties and attorney fees. View "LaFayette Bone & Joint Clinic v. Louisiana United Business SIF" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana recommended that James J. Best, a judge for the Eighteenth Judicial District, Parishes of Iberville, Pointe Coupee, and West Baton Rouge, be disciplined. The Commission alleged Judge Best committed misconduct and should be suspended for thirty days and ordered to reimburse the costs incurred in the Commission’s investigation and prosecution of this case. Judge Best did not contest the recommendation and, along with the Commission, filed a joint motion urging the Supreme Court to accept and implement the recommendation as a consent discipline. The Supreme Court rejected the joint motion and docketed the case for a full evaluation of the record. After a thorough review of the facts and law in this matter, the Supreme Court found that a fifteen-day suspension, without pay, and reimbursement of costs to be an appropriate sanction. View "In re: Judge James Best, Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Court of Iberville, Pointe Coupee & West Baton Rouge Parishes" on Justia Law

The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana recommended that respondent, Justice of the Peace J. Roosevelt Gremillion, District Seven, Parish of Pointe Coupee, be removed from office and ordered to reimburse to the Judiciary Commission and the Office of Special Counsel the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this case. After conducting an investigation, the Commission filed a formal charge against Justice of the Peace Gremillion alleging that he violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(4), and 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and engaged in willful misconduct relating to his official duty and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Specifically, the charge alleged that Justice of the Peace Gremillion rendered a judgment without giving the defendants a meaningful opportunity to be heard, without requiring the plaintiff to present any evidence or sworn testimony, and without giving the defendants written notice of the judgment against them; displayed bias or prejudice throughout the proceedings in favor of the creditor and/or against the defendants’ efforts to defend the claim against them; notarized power of attorney forms when the purported affiants did not appear before him, swear out an oath, or sign the forms in his presence; and used a notary stamp that gave the incorrect impression he was an attorney. After a thorough review of the facts and law in this matter, including the stipulations of material facts and conclusions of law entered into by the respondent and the Office of Special Counsel, the Louisiana Supreme Court found clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support the charge. The Court agreed with the Judiciary Commission's recommendation of discipline that Justice of the Peace Gremillion be removed from office and ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission the amount of $1,547.43. View "In re: Justice of the Peace J. Roosevelt Gremillion, Dist. Seven, Parish of Pointe Coupee" on Justia Law