Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This medical malpractice case arose from the death of Lyric Pitts, seven month old daughter of plaintiffs David Pitts, Jr. and Kenyetta Gurley. A jury found in favor of defendant Dr. Rhoda Jones. Plaintiffs moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), or alternatively for a new trial. The district court granted the JNOV and conditionally granted the new trial. The court of appeal reversed and reinstated the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' writ application to review the correctness of the lower courts' rulings on the JNOV and new trial. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's ruling reversing the district court's grant of the JNOV. However, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal relative to the new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's grant of a new trial. View "Pitts v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gerald Castille worked as a school bus driver for the St. Martin Parish School Board. During his first few years, plaintiff drove two "undesirable" routes, as they "required the assigned bus driver to travel very long distances while trying to maintain a safe and orderly bus populated with children from families that were known to have little or no respect for the bus operators. . . ." In 1980, plaintiff was assigned to the "Highway 31 Route," which was initially considered undesirable, plaintiff asserted it changed over time and became more desirable as the route became less populated. While driving that route for nearly thirty years, plaintiff claimed to have developed relationships with the students and their parents, noting the route gave him "a sense of purpose and dignity." In the spring of 2008, the costs of diesel fuel began to rise, and the School Board was forced to take steps to save money by redrawing and reassigning bus routes. Prior to the start of the 2008-2009 school year, the bus drivers received their new route assignments. The School Board assigned plaintiff a combined "Levee-Portage Route," two of his old routes, with no change in his salary, health benefits, or retirement. Plaintiff objected to this new route, but claimed the bus manager told him to try the route for a few weeks and come back if he was still unhappy. After two weeks, plaintiff requested to be returned to the Highway 31 route, but was told to deal with the current situation. He alerted his supervisors to the problems, but claim they took no action. According to plaintiff, he began experiencing anxiety and depression problems during this time. His problems continued until 2011, when a more desirable vacant route became available. Plaintiff filed the instant suit against the School Board, alleging the School Board violated La. R.S. 17:493.14 in assigning the bus routes in 2008. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to consider whether the court of appeal erred in awarding plaintiff damages for bad faith breach of contract. The Court found the court of appeal erred in awarding bad faith damages and therefore reversed that portion of the court of appeal's judgment, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Castille v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

This action for nullity was brought by a judgment creditor against a judgment debtor and his wife. At issue was whether the couple’s failure to file a codally-required joint petition to commence the termination of their community property regime resulted in an absolute nullity or a relative nullity. Because the failure to file a joint petition results in a relative nullity as defined by La. C.C. art. 2031, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment holding to the contrary. Judgment was rendered in favor of the couple. View "Radcliffe 10, LLC v. Burger" on Justia Law

This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) that Judge Darryl Derbigny be publicly censured, ordered to reimburse the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judicial Expense Fund (“JEF”) $57,359.96, and ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $8,150.24 in hard costs. The recommendation stems from Judge Derbigny’s participation in the district court’s supplemental insurance program and charges that he accepted insurance coverage and benefits beyond those allowed by law or available to all other court employees, the premiums for which were paid from the JEF. The Supreme Court concluded the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Derbigny’s participation in the district court’s supplemental insurance program rose to the level of sanctionable misconduct under either the Code of Judicial Conduct or Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. However, the Court agreed with the Commission that Judge Derbigny was not entitled to the benefits of any whole life insurance policies or the Exec-U-Care program under the plain language of La. R.S. 13:691. Because Judge Derbigny already surrendered the cash value of the whole life policies to the JEF, the Court ordered him to reimburse the JEF $10,002.58, representing the out-of-pocket reimbursements paid to Judge Derbigny under the Exec-U-Care program. The Court declined to impose Judge Derbigny with hard costs incurred by the Commission. View "In re: Judge Darryl Derbigny" on Justia Law

In 2003, plaintiff Kimberly Thibodeaux became pregnant with her fourth child. Dr. James Donnell was her obstetrician-gynecologist throughout her pregnancy. During the course of the pregnancy, plaintiff was diagnosed with complete placenta previa and, in mid-November, at approximately 29 weeks pregnant, she was hospitalized for four days. Upon Dr. Donnell’s referral, she consulted a maternal/fetal medicine specialist who handled high risk pregnancies; the specialist recommended rest, limited activity, and delivery of plaintiff’s child at 36-37 weeks gestation. Plaintiff returned to the hospital with renewed vaginal bleeding and contractions. Dr. Donnell delivered plaintiff’s child via cesarean section. Shortly after the baby’s delivery, Dr. Donnell performed an emergency cesarean hysterectomy, which entailed removal of plaintiff’s uterus and cervix. After completing the hysterectomy, and while preparing to close plaintiff’s abdomen, Dr. Donnell discovered a large laceration to her bladder, which he repaired himself. After completing the surgery, Dr. Donnell ordered a test to determine if the bladder repair was successful. The test revealed that the bladder sutures were obstructing plaintiff’s ureters, the tubes that drain urine from the kidney into the bladder. This obstruction was then confirmed by a cystoscopy performed by a urologist, Dr. Robert Alexander, consulted by Dr. Donnell. The same day as the birth and cesarean hysterectomy, Dr. Alexander reopened plaintiff’s abdomen, removed the bladder sutures to free the ureters, and re-repaired the bladder laceration. Plaintiff followed up again with Dr. Alexander in late April 2004. Although her bladder healed, plaintiff continued to see Dr. Alexander for three years with irritative bladder symptoms, including urinary frequency every 30-60 minutes, urgency, urine leakage, painful urination, painful sexual intercourse, urination during sexual intercourse, excessive nighttime urination, and abdominal pain. Dr. Alexander diagnosed her with interstitial cystitis, also known as painful bladder syndrome, and prescribed medications, none of which relieved plaintiff’s symptoms. According to Dr. Alexander, plaintiff’s diminished bladder capacity was permanent. The Supreme Court granted review of this case to determine whether the court of appeal properly assessed damages under the principles set forth in “Coco v. Winston Industries Inc.,” (341 So. 2d 332 (La. 1976)). The Court found that, because the court of appeal found manifest error in the jury’s factual findings, the appellate court should have instead performed a de novo review of damages under the principles outlined in “Mart v. Hill,” (505 So. 2d 1120 (La. 1987)). Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal and remanded back to that court for reconsideration under the proper caselaw precedent. View "Thibodeaux v. Donnell" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeffrey Clark and a number of fellow inmates incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana (“Angola”) conspired to escape from prison. In furtherance of that plot, on the evening of December 28, 1999, they smuggled improvised weapons into the Angola education building, where various scheduled meetings and classes were taking place. There, they launched an attack on the prison guards present, hoping to obtain keys necessary to gain access to a nearby vehicle and to exit a secure access sally port to leave the prison and escape to Canada. The escape attempt was thwarted when prison officials discovered the disturbance and quickly surrounded the education building. Captain David Knapps, who had been taken hostage by the inmates, was bludgeoned and stabbed to death. Each inmate involved was tried separately, and Clark was convicted of the first degree murder of Captain Knapps and sentenced to death. On automatic appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant raised thirty-seven assignments of error, contending his conviction and sentence should be reversed. After a thorough review of the law and evidence, the Court found no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dana Johno filed suit against Plaquemines Parish Government (“PPG”) and numerous other defendants alleging his house was unlawfully demolished by PPG and its agents after Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff subsequently moved to have La. R.S. 9:2800.17, which provided retroactive statutory immunity to the government and its agents for certain actions taken in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, declared unconstitutional. The District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion. Significantly, the issue of immunity was never raised or argued by PPG. Only one of the defendants, Hard Rock Construction, LLC, one of the contractors for PPG, appealed the District Court’s ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed: "When a party acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the law, that right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due process. Thus, a cause of action, once accrued, cannot be divested by subsequent legislation." Because the plaintiff’s causes of action accrued before effective date of the statute, the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this matter. View "Johno v. Doe" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a tax exclusion, La. R.S. 47:301(14)(g)(i)(bb), which provided exclusions from state and local sales tax of charges for repairs on certain property that was delivered to customers out of state. At the local tax level, the 2013 version of this tax exclusion was mandatory for tax authorities in East Feliciana Parish and optional for all other parishes, municipalities and school boards. The question presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was, when the legislature enacted a tax exclusion, whether La. Const. art. VI, section 29(D)(1) required the legislature to treat tax authorities in all parishes the same or to make tax authorities in all parishes act the same. The Supreme Court held that the uniformity provision of the constitution, based on its plain and unambiguous meaning, required that a legislative tax exclusion treat tax authorities in all parishes the same. The Court found La. R.S. 47:301(14)(g)(i)(bb), as amended in 2013, to be unconstitutional because tax authorities in all parishes are not required to apply the tax exclusion in the same form, manner, or degree. "However, the portion of this statutory provision-mandating tax authorities in East Feliciana Parish apply the exclusion-is severable from the rest." Therefore, the Court severed this portion, leaving the balance of the statutory provision unchanged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court ruling and remanded this matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arrow Aviation Co., LLC. v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Taylor was charged with possession with intent to distribute (“PWITD”) cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The state sought to introduce evidence of defendant’s three alleged prior convictions at trial: one PWITD cocaine and two for possession of cocaine. In accordance with Louisiana Code of Evidence article 404(B)(1) and "Louisiana v. Prieur," (277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973)), the state filed two notices of intent to introduce such evidence, attaching the three police reports associated with these prior incidents to satisfy its burden of proof. The district court issued rulings allowing the state to introduce the other crimes evidence and the court of appeal denied defendant’s writ applications. The Supreme Court granted defendant’s two writ applications to address the correctness of the district court’s rulings and to re-examine the requirements and procedure for introduction of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” evidence at trial. The Court affirmed the ruling of the district court relative to the admissibility of defendant’s prior PWITD cocaine conviction. However, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling relative to the admissibility of defendant’s prior two convictions for possession of cocaine and remanded this matter back to the district court to conduct a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of this evidence. View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodricus Crawford was indicted by grand jury for the first-degree murder of his one-year-old son, committed while engaged in the perpetration of cruelty to juveniles and second degree cruelty to juveniles and while the victim was under twelve years of age. Following the close of evidence, a jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged and, after the penalty phase of the trial, recommended the death sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to death in accordance with that recommendation. Defendant raised twenty-three alleged errors at trial as grounds to reverse the sentence; the Supreme Court found merit in only one: error relating to his “Batson challenge.” Defendant’s conviction and sentence were therefore vacated, and this matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Crawford" on Justia Law