Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from post-operative injuries plaintiff Richard Dupuy sustained based on a hospital’s alleged failure to properly maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical instruments. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs’ claims that the hospital failed to properly maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical instruments fell within the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”). The Supreme Court concluded the claims did fall within the MMA and reversed the ruling of the district court which held to the contrary. View "Dupuy v. NMC Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Spine Hospital of Louisiana" on Justia Law

This matter comes before the Louisiana Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission that respondent, Justice of the Peace Leroy J. Laiche, Jr., Second Justice of the Peace Court, Parish of Ascension, State of Louisiana, be removed from office and be ordered to reimburse the Commission the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter. The Court agreed with the Commission's findings that respondent failed to timely refund bond money and inadvertently held bond money in excess of that permitted by law. Furthermore, the Court found the record demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that respondent issued peace bond judgments without a hearing or giving the defendants a meaningful opportunity to be heard on five occasions. The Commission determined that respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(1), 3A(3), 3A(4), 3A(7), 3B(1) and 3B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and concluded that Justice of the Peace Laiche’s misconduct constituted egregious legal errors sufficient to rise to the level of judicial misconduct for which a judge should be removed from office under Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. After thoroughly reviewing the record, The Supreme Court adopted its recommendation of discipline. View "In re: Justice of the Peace Leroy J. Laiche, Jr." on Justia Law

"Grappling with whether a child should be moved from what is oftentimes perceived as the stable and long-standing environment provided by a non-parent who has been awarded custody as a domiciliary parent, the appellate courts have developed different approaches for evaluating the request of a biological parent to be awarded domiciliary parent status." This matter involved a custody dispute between the biological father and the maternal grandmother, who was designated as the domiciliary parent in a consent decree. Because of conflicting analysis of this issue by the courts of appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ to determine the standard for adjudicating a request for increased custodial rights brought by a biological parent who shared joint custody with a grandparent, and the biological parent had earlier stipulated that the grandparent should be designated as having the rights and responsibilities of a domiciliary parent. Applying the "best-interest-of-the-child" standard, the Court found that in this case, the biological father satisfied the first element of proof in the best-interest analysis: there has been a material change in circumstances after the original custody award. However, the biological father failed to prove that a modification from the long-standing and stable environment the child had experienced while domiciled in the home of the grandparent would be in the child’s best interest. The Court ultimately affirmed the appellate court's judgment to maintain the joint custody arrangement with the grandparent as domiciliary parent. View "Tracie F. v. Francisco D." on Justia Law

Following deliberations, a six-person jury found defendant Gerald Dahlem guilty on a fourth offense of Driving While Intoxicated (DWI), and the trial court sentenced defendant as a habitual offender to 25 years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The court of appeal affirmed both defendant’s conviction and his sentence. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether trial by a jury composed of fewer jurors than required by law was a non-waivable structural defect which required that a defendant’s conviction be reversed and his sentence vacated. Specifically, the narrow question before the Court was whether defendant was denied a fair trial and due process of law because he was, without contemporaneous objection at trial, tried by a six-person jury, instead of a twelve-person jury, on his DWI charge. The Court found that due to defendant’s multiple offender status and subsequent sentence as such, his trial by a six-person jury was not an error requiring his conviction be reversed or his sentence vacated. View "Louisiana v. Dahlem" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Robert Coleman with for the first-degree murder of 70-year-old Julian Brandon, Jr., and the attempted first-degree murder of Brandon’s wife, Alice. A jury later found Coleman guilty and voted for the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court found a “Batson” violation and remanded for a new trial. A second jury also found Coleman guilty and again voted for the death penalty. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence raising 38 assignments of error, variously combined into 21arguments. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found no merit in any alleged error relative to the issue of guilt. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s first-degree murder conviction. However, the Court found error relative to the state’s failure to provide sufficient notice of evidence of an unadjudicated murder introduced in the penalty phase. Thus, the Court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded this case for a new sentencing hearing. View "Louisiana v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the court of appeal overruled the juvenile court and sustained the biological parents’ peremptory exception of no right of action, on the basis the couple having custody of the child did not possess a private right of action to petition for termination of parental rights under La. Ch. Code art. 1004. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in concluding the petition was improperly brought by private counsel for the custodians upon approval of the juvenile court. View "Louisiana in the interest of K.C.C." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the allotment system of criminal cases in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court when the date of the offense is uncertain, specifically, whether La. Dist. Ct. Rule 14.0 or the defendants’ due process rights are violated by the case allotment system of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, which randomly assigns cases to different District Judges based on the first date of the first alleged offense. Defendants argued the procedure in place at the time of the allotment of their cases was unconstitutional as applied to multi-count, multi-defendant cases, or to cases in which the date of offense is uncertain and in which the prosecutor has discretion to allege the earliest date of a charged offense. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court’s allotment process was sufficiently random and did not vest the District Attorney with the power to choose the Judge to whom a particular case is assigned, instead tethering judicial assignment to the defendant’s conduct. As defendants presented no evidence of actual manipulation or prejudice, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal granting the motions to quash allotment and ordering re-allotment, reinstate the trial courts’ denials of the defendants’ motions to quash and/or for re-allotment, and remanded these cases to their respective trial courts for further proceedings. View "Lousiana v. Nunez" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between the City of Kenner and Kenner’s firefighters concerning the computation of retirement benefits under La. R.S. 11:233 and 11:2252. The dispute centered around four types of compensation: educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay. The primary question presented to the Supreme Court was whether these types of compensation should be considered “earnable compensation” for purposes of calculating the firefighters’ pension contributions. After review, the Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that no genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether each of the four types of pay constituted “earnable compensation” under the requirements of the statutes. View "Dunn v. City of Kenner" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to determine whether the lower courts erred in allowing certain expert psychological testimony as to the victim’s intelligence quotient (IQ) and in admitting into evidence a letter written by the expert which contained hearsay evidence. Defendant Vernon Mullins was indicted for the aggravated rape of J.W. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant raised issues he claimed the trial court made that warrant reversal of sentence: (1) allowing Dr. Mark Vigen, the State’s expert psychologist, to present evidence as to the results of IQ testing he did not administer or score violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) the lower courts erred in allowing hearsay testimony and the introduction into evidence of a letter Dr. Vigen prepared in advance of trial, both of which were based on information gained from persons who did not testify; (3) the lower courts erred in allowing the introduction of Dr. Vigen’s letter, where the letter contained hearsay, not subject to any exception; and (4) the court of appeal erred in failing to find that the trial court had erred in allowing expert testimony where the State failed to comply with Article 705(B) of the Code of Evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that the letter containing the IQ test results and introduced by the State for the primary purpose of proving an essential element of the crime of aggravated rape contains testimonial statements and therefore was subject to Confrontation Clause requirements. As a result, the trial court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by ruling the letter could be admitted into evidence without testimony. Furthermore, the Court found that the introduction of the letter violated the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions below, vacated Defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded this case to the District Court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Defendant Quint Mire shot and killed Julian Gajan in 2011. They were hunting deer out-of-season. Defendant shot the victim three times with a semi-automatic shotgun, striking him in the head, neck, and torso from a distance of approximately 40 to 70 feet. Defendant collected the spent shotgun shells and left without trying to render aid and did not seek help. Defendant then discarded the shotgun shells in a canal. The victim was reported missing the next day. His body was found after a search by state and parish agencies and members of the community. Defendant stood by while others diligently searched and even took steps to divert attention from himself and cast suspicion on others. Defendant later admitted to detectives that he shot and killed the victim. He claimed it was a hunting accident. Defendant was charged with second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant testified at trial, characterizing the shooting as a terrible mistake. When asked why he did not attempt to assist the victim, defendant claimed he had a crippling fear of the dead. The state’s witnesses described the tumultuous relationship between defendant and victim over the years and their various business disputes. The jury found defendant guilty as charged of second degree murder and obstruction of justice. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for murder, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor for obstruction. The court of appeal, however, vacated defendant’s conviction for second degree murder, entered a judgment of guilty of negligent homicide, and remanded for sentencing because it found the evidence insufficient to establish defendant’s specific intent. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. "The lynchpin of the court of appeal’s analysis was its determination that the state failed to establish a clear motive for the killing. The court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation of the evidence regarding defendant’s motive for that of the jury, and thus failed to correctly apply the due process standard. Although the court of appeal found the evidence of specific intent equivocal, the jury’s acceptance of this evidence was not shown to be irrational." Defendant’s conviction for second degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility were reinstated. View "Louisiana v. Mire" on Justia Law