Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph E. Boudreaux, II and Jennifer Boudreaux were married in 1997, divorced in 2011. The couple had two children during their marriage. The parties entered into a consent judgment with regard to custody, visitation, and child support. In September 2011, Joseph filed a rule to change custody and reduce child support. The trial court modified the custody arrangement, but denied the motion to reduce the child support amount. Joseph applied for services through the Department of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), applying for support enforcement services available through the IV-D program, which allowed him to pay his support obligation directly to DCFS, who, as the new payee, would then tender the amount to Jennifer. In exchange for the services, he paid a twenty-five dollar registration fee, as well as a monthly administrative fee assessed by DCFS in the amount of five percent of his support obligation. This administrative fee was assessed in addition to his full support obligation. Joseph again moved to reduce his child support payments. Relying on La. R.S. 46:236.1.2 and 42 U.S.C. 654 (B)(i)-(ii), Jennifer filed an exception of no right of action, arguing DCFS had no right to intercede because the claim was not properly within the jurisdiction of IV-D categories over which a hearing officer has authority. In particular, she asserted that in order to invoke the services of DCFS, one must be receiving public benefits or delinquent in their child support payments. Jennifer's exception was denied, and the trial court ultimately reduced Joseph's child support. The court of appeal reversed, holding Joseph did not meet the requirements of the IV-D program. The Supreme Court reviewed this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in its reversal. Finding that it did, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Boudreaux v. Boudreaux" on Justia Law

In 1998, an Orleans Parish jury found respondent Ronald Marshall guilty of armed robbery. Following a habitual offender hearing, the trial court adjudicated respondent a second felony offender and sentenced him to 49 and a half years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In 2010, respondent filed a second application for post conviction relief, asserting two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeal granted respondent's writ, in part, and denied, in part, concluding the trial court erred by summarily dismissing respondent's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to discover his attorney's time sheets and to convey the plea offer. The court remanded those claims for consideration at an evidentiary hearing, concluding they were substantively different from respondent's earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, therefore, neither repetitive nor successive. The court of appeal also ordered the trial court to grant respondent's motion to issue the subpoena duces tecum to obtain the time sheets. The state filed a writ application seeking review of the court of appeal's ruling, which was the subject of this opinion. Finding that respondent exhausted his right to state collateral review, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of claims for post-conviction relief. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether La. C.Cr.P. art. 887(A) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B) permitted the district attorney and sheriff to impose costs of prosecution and costs of investigation on convicted criminal defendants where those costs were not extraordinary or special costs unique to a particular case. After review, the Court found that these articles did permit the recovery of such costs, and further found that the costs imposed by the district court were fair, reasonable, and not excessive. View "Louisiana v. Griffin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this matter to determine whether a retiree of the City of Slidell, plaintiff Dean Born, could continue participating in the City of Slidell's health insurance plan following the City's adoption of Ordinance No. 3493, which required each city retiree to apply for Medicare coverage upon reaching the age of sixty-five. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's finding that the City could not terminate plaintiff's desired plan coverage and require him to accept Medicare coverage, because plaintiff retired before the effective date of the Ordinance. View "Born v. City of Slidell" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty as charged by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. By agreement with the state, defendant admitted the allegations in the habitual offender bill of information and was sentenced under La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) as a second felony offender to 22 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first two years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal reversed the conviction because it found the state presented insufficient evidence to prove defendant intended to distribute the cocaine. The court of appeal noted that a guest in defendant’s home, rather than defendant, was found in possession of two small rocks of crack cocaine. The court of appeal acknowledged that defendant admitted to police that he sold cocaine in small quantities but nonetheless determined that a jury could not reasonably infer defendant’s intent to sell those particular "rocks" from the evidence presented by the state. Finding that the evidence presented at trial indeed supported the conviction, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant William Graham was indicted with one count of aggravated incest. After defendant rested his case at trial and it became apparent that the State had failed to carry its burden of proof on this charge, the District Court permitted the State to add as a responsive verdict a different offense (molestation of a juvenile) than the one which had been the focus of trial and which contained an element not necessarily required by the original charge. Although neither the State nor the defendant presented any evidence concerning this new element, the jury found the defendant guilty of one of count of molestation of a juvenile, and the trial court sentenced him to serve 50 years imprisonment at hard labor with the first 25 years to be served without parole eligibility. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence. After review, the Supreme Court found that molestation of a juvenile was not a lesser included offense of the charge of aggravated incest and because defendant‘s trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the District Court permitted the State to add "guilty of molestation of a juvenile" as a responsive verdict even though defendant had no opportunity to mount a defense concerning an additional essential element of this offense, the Court reversed and vacated defendant's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the District Court for entry of a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. View "Lousiana v. Graham" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the lessors properly terminated a lease. After review, the Court found the district court was correct in finding the lease was terminated, and the court of appeal erred in disturbing the district court’s judgment. View "Lobell v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff Dr. Ralph Slaughter retired as president of Southern University System (“Southern”) after thirty-five years of service. Upon retirement, the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System (“LASERS”) began paying plaintiff retirement benefits. Plaintiff filed suit against Southern for past due wages. The district court ruled that Southern had miscalculated plaintiff’s income base by including supplemental pay plaintiff had received from the Southern University Foundation, and determined plaintiff’s terminal pay (500 hours of unused leave) and retirement should have been calculated only on his annual base salary due from Southern. The court of appeal affirmed on appeal, noting plaintiff “manipulated the system and used his position for his own benefit.” Southern sent a letter to LASERS advising it had committed an error in including supplemental funds in plaintiff’s earnings. Because plaintiff's lawsuit was ongoing at the time, LASERS filed a concursus proceeding seeking to deposit the disputed amount of plaintiff’s benefit in the registry of court pending resolution of the litigation. Plaintiff filed an exception of no cause of action. The district court granted the exception and dismissed the second suit with prejudice. LASERS did not appeal this judgment. After the first suit became final, LASERS sent correspondence to plaintiff advising it intended to retroactively reduce his retirement benefit starting June 1, 2012 “due to an error made by Southern University in the reporting of your earnings.” Relying on La. R.S. 11:192, LASERS maintained it could adjust benefits and further reduce the corrected benefit to recover overpayment within a reasonable number of months. Plaintiff then filed the instant suit against LASERS, seeking a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment confirming LASERS had no authority or ability to reduce his retirement benefits. The petition alleged plaintiff’s retirement benefits should have been calculated based on the entirety of his earnings over thirty-five years of employment, including salary supplements. The Supreme Court was called on to determine whether the lower courts erred in finding the defendant retirement system failed to prove that it followed the proper procedure before initiating action to reduce and recoup plaintiff’s retirement benefits. The Court found the lower courts did not apply the proper statutory analysis and reached an erroneous result. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Slaughter v. Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Whitney and Pamela Smith entered into a residential mortgage contract with Saxon Mortgage Services (“Saxon”), which was secured with a promissory note on the Smiths’ home in Grant Parish. The Smiths later failed to make their installment payments beginning June 1, 2004. Two months later, Mr. Smith died in an automobile accident. On November 4, 2004, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase”), as trustee for Saxon, filed suit for executory process against the Smiths, seeking to deliver a notice of seizure to Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith, fearing that she would be evicted from her home over the holidays, moved her children out of the house and sought an injunction to stop the seizure by executory process. In support, she argued the foreclosure documents were not in authentic form pursuant to the requirements set forth in La. Code Civ. P. art. 2635(A)(2) because they were executed in front of only one witness. Ms. Smith also filed a reconventional and third party demands against Chase, alleging wrongful seizure, conversion, and federal due process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Ultimately, the Banks were found to have improperly seized the Smith home. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether private attorneys for the lender were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground their actions did not violate 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Supreme Court found that the district court properly granted summary judgment, and the court of appeal erred in reversing that judgment. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Toby Fruge was charged with the forcible rape of two women, R.A. (count 1) and J.H. (count 2), in two separate incidents that occurred approximately two years apart. The State’s petitioned the Supreme Court for review of those portions of the appellate court's decision that reversed the district court’s imposition of the maximum sentence for defendant’s simple rape conviction and remanded the case to the district court with instructions for resentencing. Upon review of the appellate court record, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, in part, reinstated defendant’s simple rape sentence, and remanded to the district court for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Fruge" on Justia Law