Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from a petition filed by vendors of mineral rights, plaintiff John C. McCarthy, individually and as trustee of the Kathleen Balden Trust, and plaintiff Marjorie Moss. Plaintiffs named as defendant Evolution Petroleum Corporation, which was formerly known as Natural Gas Systems, Inc. Plaintiffs also named as a defendant NGS Sub. Corp. (“NGS”). Plaintiffs sought damages and rescission of their sale of royalty interests in mineral leases within the Delhi Field Unit, located in Richland Parish. Plaintiffs alleged fraud and error as grounds for rescission. The defendants filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action, which the district court granted, and the case was dismissed. In the first of two appeals in this case, the appellate court affirmed the exception of no cause of action, but reversed the dismissal with instructions to the district court on remand to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their petition to state a cause of action. The cause of action that plaintiffs came up with was, according to the appellate court, "novel and untested," and the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether that cause of action comported with Louisiana mineral law. The purported cause of action imposed a duty on a mineral lessee purchasing the lessor’s mineral royalty rights to disclose to the lessor that the lessee has already negotiated the resale of the mineral rights to a third party for a significantly higher price. Finding the lessee’s duties upon which the appellate court premised its cause of action to be expressly excluded in the Mineral Code, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, and reinstated the district court’s decision, which ruled plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action and dismissed this case with prejudice. View "McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Terrence Roberson was charged with armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder for offenses which allegedly occurred in 2012, when the defendant was sixteen years old. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Juvenile Court’s dismissal of defendant's case for expiration of the time period for adjudication provided in the Children’s Code prevented the District Attorney from later obtaining a grand jury indictment against defendant and bringing the case to District Court. In this case, the District Court quashed the defendant’s indictment on the basis of the Juvenile Court’s prior dismissal of the juvenile petition with prejudice. The Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s grant of the motion to quash. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Patricia Thompson was injured when she slipped and fell in a puddle of water while shopping at a Winn-Dixie store. Plaintiff filed suit against Winn-Dixie, which in turn filed a third party demand against Southern Cleaning Services, Inc. (“SCSI”) which was contracted to provide floor care and janitorial services to Winn-Dixie. SCSI filed a third party claim against its subcontractor for those services, KAP Cleaning Services, Inc. (“KAP”). Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, finding KAP 70% at fault and Winn-Dixie 30% at fault. On appeal, the court amended the district court’s judgment holding that Winn-Dixie was statutorily 100% at fault. Winn-Dixie appealed. After a review of the law and record, the Supreme Court found the court of appeal erred in amending the trial court’s judgment to assign 100% fault to Winn-Dixie. The Court found the jury’s allocation of 30% fault to Winn-Dixie and 70% fault to KAP to be supported by the record. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal as to apportionment of liability and reinstated the district court’s judgment on the jury’s allocation of fault. View "Thompson v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2010, Eddie Hoffman was injured when his vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Carolyn Elzy. Hoffman filed suit against Ms. Elzy and her insurer, 21st Century North America Insurance Company for damages allegedly resulting from the accident. This case presented with a question of first impression for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review as to whether a write-off from a medical provider, negotiated by plaintiff's attorney, could be considered a collateral source from which the tortfeasor receives no set-off. Applying Louisiana law and the principles set forth in our Civil Code, the Court found that such a write-off did not fall within the scope of the collateral source rule. View "Hoffman v. 21st Century North America Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In November 2008, a grand jury indicted defendant Lamondre Tucker for the first degree murder of Tavia Sills. After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury unanimously returned a verdict of death, finding aggravating circumstances that: (1) the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of second degree kidnaping; and (2) the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death in accordance with the jury's determination. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, raising 55 assignments of error, combined into 21 arguments. After a thorough review of the law and the evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found no merit in any of the assignments of error. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Tucker" on Justia Law

In a cold-case prosecution initiated over 12 years after the victim died, the state charged defendant by grand jury indictment with second degree murder. A jury found defendant guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed defendant's conviction and sentence after finding that the evidence presented at trial did not support a verdict for either the charged offense or for its responsive verdict of manslaughter, an apparent compromise, and entered a judgment of acquittal. The state appealed. After briefing and argument and independent review of the record, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal and affirmed. View "Louisiana v. Robertson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the state’s writ application to determine whether a person required to register as a sex offender as a result of an offense committed as a juvenile under La. R.S. 15:542 had to comply with the sex offender identification required by La. R.S. 32:412(I) or La. R.S. 40:1321(J). After briefing and argument, it became apparent that the deficient record in this matter did not permit the Court to answer that question. Rather, the record made clear that the respondent in this case, K.L.A., was not required by La. R.S. 15:542 to register as a sex offender, though he agreed to do so by plea. Based on the specific facts of this case, the Court found he was also not required to obtain the sex offender identification. The judgments of the district court and the court of appeal were affirmed, solely as to their ruling that respondent himself was not required to obtain the sex offender identification required of sex offender registrants. View "Louisiana in the interest of K.L.A." on Justia Law

The predecessor(s) of defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company acquired the right to build a railroad over the property at issue in this case in the late 1880s. The railroad company provided not only public crossings over its tracks but also private crossings for the convenience of landowners, whose large tracts of land were divided by the railroad tracks. Sometime in 2006, Union Pacific began posting written notices at selected private railroad crossings, indicating its intent to close those crossings. In 2007, plaintiffs, who alleged their farming operations would be disrupted by the closure of the private crossings on which they relied to move farming equipment and materials from one section of farmland to another separated by the railroad tracks, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Union Pacific from closing approximately ten private crossings and to require that Union Pacific reopen the private crossings it had already closed. Union Pacific removed the suit to the federal district court and filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to permit it to close the private crossings and to prevent the plaintiffs from interfering. Shortly after the filing of this litigation, the Louisiana Legislature passed 2008 La. Acts, No. 530 (effective August 15, 2008), enacting LSA-R.S. 48:394, which required the submission of an advance written notice, by registered or certified mail, to the Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC”) and to the “owner or owners of record of the private crossing traversed by the rail line” by a railroad company desiring to close or remove a private crossing. The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted a certified question of Louisiana law presented from the federal district court, which asked: whether the application of LA. REV. STAT. section 48:394 to any of the properties in this case amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property without a public purpose, in violation of Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that LSA-R.S. 48:394 did not effect an unconstitutional taking of private property as applied to the facts established in this case. View "Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

According to her Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, plaintiff Kasha LaPointe was employed as a tenured public school teacher by defendant Vermilion Parish School Board (“VPSB or the Board”). Jerome Puyau, the Superintendent of Schools for VPSB advised LaPointe that a “due process hearing” would be held in his office to address charges of alleged “willful neglect of duty” and “dishonesty.” According to the Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, this letter, also called the “charge letter” by the parties, advised LaPointe that she would be “afforded an opportunity to respond” to the allegations but that “[n]o witnesses [would] be heard….” However, LaPointe did appear with her counsel in the office of the superintendent and did present, with counsel's assistance, her explanations and responses to the allegations in the “charge letter.” After that hearing, the Board elected to terminate LaPointe's employment. LaPointe challenged the termination, asking for a Tenure Hearing Panel. The Tenure Hearing Panel was convened. The hearing officer and the panel proceeded to take evidence and hear testimony, all of which was preserved. Thereafter, the panel made its recommendation, voting 2-1 to concur with the superintendent‟s action to terminate LaPointe's employment. LaPointe timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 17:443(B)(2), requesting judicial review of her termination. No judicial review of the termination itself had been conducted at this point, owing to a constitutional challenge. As to the constitutional challenge, LaPointe requested a judicial declaration that Act 1 of 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature was unconstitutional in its entirety and further declaring Act 1 to be null, void, and of no legal effect whatsoever. She alleged the hearing provisions of Act 1 deprived her of her vested property right to continued employment without due process of law as required by Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2, and of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. Because the constitutionality of Act 1 was challenged, the Attorney General later intervened as a defendant in the matter. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the lower court erred in declaring unconstitutional on its face Act 1 of the 2012 Legislative Session as codified in La. Rev. Stat. 17:443(B)(1) and (2). Upon de novo review, the Court found the court of appeal erred in declaring La. Rev. Stat. 17:443 as amended by Act 1 of 2012 unconstitutional on its face because it did not afford a full evidentiary hearing before a neutral adjudicator prior to termination. Instead, the Court found La. Rev. Stat. 17:443 as amended by Act 1 of 2012 provided sufficient due process to protect the tenured teacher's vested employment rights. View "LaPointe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

The issue this matter presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on the “amount in dispute” which determined subject matter jurisdiction of a city court with a jurisdictional limit of $30,000. After filing suit, plaintiff settled with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor’s liability insurer for $25,000, plaintiff’s claim against her uninsured motorist insurer was the only claim left. The issue to be determined was whether following the dismissal of the settling defendants, the city court had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim against her uninsured motorist insurer to the full extent of that court’s $30,000 jurisdictional limit. Put another way, the issue in this case was whether the settlement amount counted toward the city court’s jurisdictional limit. The Court held that it did not: because the $25,000 settlement amount no longer constituted part of the “amount in dispute,” the city court’s jurisdiction over the uninsured motorist claim was to the full extent of its $30,000 jurisdictional limit. Therefore, the appellate court’s decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the court of appeal for further consideration. View "Swayze v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law