Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the City of New Orleans (CNO) enacted a group of ordinances, codified as Sections 154-1701 through 15-1704 of its Code of Ordinances, which created the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (“ATES”). In 2011, plaintiffs filed a “Petition for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction,” alleging the administrative hearing procedure set out in these ordinances violated Louisiana State Constitution Article I, section 2 due process rights and Article I, section 22 access to courts rights. Following an adversarial hearing, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction “enjoining, prohibiting, and restraining the City of New Orleans from conducting any administrative hearings authorized by the enabling ordinance section 154-1701 et seq.” The trial court further ordered that its ruling would be stayed “pending final resolution of a writ application to the 4th Circuit Court of appeals [sic] by the City of New Orleans.” In its written reasons for judgment, the District Court found that the enforcement procedure for the CNO's Automated Traffic Enforcement System gave the CNO administrative authority to adjudicate violations. The CNO, therefore, had a financial stake in the outcome of the cases adjudicated by hearing officers in their employ and/or paid by them, raising due process considerations. Thereafter, the City filed a supervisory writ application with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the trial court's assessment of the due process problems inherent in the ATES administrative adjudication procedure and finding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the Plaintiffs presented prima facie evidence that they are entitled to the preliminary injunction and may prevail on the merits.” The City filed a supervisory writ application with the Supreme Court seeking review of the District Court's judgment granting the plaintiffs' the preliminary injunction. The Court unanimously denied the City's writ. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and they are entitled to summary judgment granting a permanent injunction as a matter of law based solely “on the affidavits attached and the opinion of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals [sic] and the concurring opinion of Judge Belsom [sic].” Attached to the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment were: (1) the affidavits of plaintiffs, Keisha Guichard, Edmond Harris, Lee Rand, and Jeremy Boyce; (2) the District Court's judgment granting plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, along with the court's written reasons for judgment; (3) the Fourth Circuit's opinion affirming the judgment granting the preliminary injunction; and (4) the Supreme Court's action sheet, denying the City's application for supervisory review of the preliminary injunction. The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The City appealed. Finding that plaintiffs failed to follow the strictures of motion for summary judgment procedure, the Supreme Court declined to address the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional challenge. Due to the fatal flaws present in plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's judgment granting the permanent injunction, reinstated the preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from undertaking any hearings based on this ordinance, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Rand v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

This was a legal malpractice case. Defendant Michelle Myer-Bennett filed a peremptory exception of peremption asserting plaintiff Tracy Lomont filed her malpractice claim beyond the three-year peremptive period set forth in La. R.S. 9:5605. Lomont opposed the exception, arguing the peremptive period should not have applied because Myer-Bennett engaged in fraudulent behavior which prevented application of the peremptive period. Lomont hired Myer-Bennett to represent her in a divorce and related domestic matters, which included partitioning the community property. Citibank obtained a default judgment against John Lomont (the ex-husband) on a delinquent account. Citibank recorded the judgment in the mortgage records in Jefferson Parish as a lien against the home. Lomont attempted to refinance the mortgage on the home and learned from the bank that the settlement agreement, giving her full ownership of the home, was never recorded in the mortgage and conveyance records. Lomont contacted Myer-Bennett to advise her of the problem. According to Myer-Bennett, because it was her standard practice to record such documents, she initially believed Lomont was given inaccurate information by the bank. Upon investigation, Myer-Bennett discovered that she had not recorded the agreement. Myer-Bennett recorded the agreement the next day, September 30, 2010. In December 2010, Lomont was notified that her application to refinance the loan was denied because of Citibank’s lien on the property. According to Myer-Bennett, once she became aware of the Citibank lien she discussed with Lomont the fact she committed malpractice and gave Lomont several options to proceed, including hiring another lawyer to sue her, or allowing Myer-Bennett to file suit against John Lomont and/or Citibank to have the lien removed. Myer-Bennett stated. Lomont chose not to pursue a malpractice action, but wanted defendant to fix the problem. Lomont denied Myer-Bennett ever notified her she had committed malpractice. Lomont contended Myer-Bennett never mentioned malpractice in December 2010, but simply advised she would have the Citibank lien removed from the property by filing lawsuits against John Lomont and Citibank. The district court sustained the exception of peremption and the court of appeal affirmed. Based on the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found defendant committed fraud within the meaning of La. R.S. 9:5605(E). Thus, the peremptive periods contained in La. R.S. 9:5605 were not applicable and plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim was governed by the one-year prescriptive period in La. C.C. art. 3492. Further, the facts of this case supported an application of the doctrine of contra non valentem. Because the Court found plaintiff filed suit within one year of discovering defendant’s malpractice, the Court held the lower courts erred in sustaining defendant’s exception of peremption. View "Lomont v. Myer-Bennett" on Justia Law

On March 15, 2008, a multi-vehicle accident occurred in St. Tammany Parish. Robert J. Bordelon, III is alleged to have caused the accident when he swerved two separate times from the left lane of traffic to the right lane, colliding with two vehicles. The second collision involved plaintiff Richard Reynolds, who was driving a 2003 Infiniti G35S, which was manufactured by Nissan North America. After the initial impact, plaintiff was pushed into another vehicle and came to rest in a ditch. The accident caused plaintiff to sustain serious injuries. Plaintiff filed suit against Bordelon and other defendants. With regard to Nissan, plaintiff asserted claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) for the failure of the air bags to deploy and/or operate. Specifically, he alleged the Infiniti was defective: (1) due to a construction or composition defect; (2) due to a design defect; (3) for failure to contain an adequate warning; and (4) for failure to conform to an express warranty. Nissan moved for summary judgment, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the LPLA claim. But finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Bordelon" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Louisiana recognized the tort of "negligent spoliation." On March 15, 2008, a multi-vehicle accident occurred in St. Tammany Parish. Plaintiff Richard Reynolds, sustained injuries and filed suit against Robert Bordelon, III, the driver alleged to have caused the accident. Plaintiff also asserted claims under the Louisiana Products Liability Act against Nissan North America, the alleged manufacturer and distributer of the plaintiff’s 2003 Infiniti G35, for failure of the airbag to deploy. Additionally, plaintiff’s petition alleged that his insurer, Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange (“ACIIE”) and the custodian of his vehicle after the accident, Insurance Auto Auctions Corporation (“IAA”), failed to preserve his vehicle for inspection purposes to determine whether any defects existed, despite being put on notice of the need for preservation. ACIIE and IAA each filed exceptions of no cause of action, arguing a claim of spoliation of evidence requires “an intentional destruction of evidence for the purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use” and the petition contained no allegation of an intentional act by ACIIE or IAA. The trial court sustained the exception but allowed the plaintiff to amend his petition within fifteen days to state a cause of action pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 934. In response, ACIIE and IAA again filed exceptions of no cause of action, and ACIIE filed a motion for summary judgment, in the alternative. The trial court denied the exceptions and the motion for summary judgment in light of an opinion recently released by the First Circuit Court of Appeal, which discussed, in dicta, the theory of "negligent spoliation." The court of appeal denied writs, with one judge on the panel noting the court "ha[d] not issued a studied opinion regarding whether a cause of action exists for negligent spoliation of evidence." A later decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeal was released, wherein the concept of negligent spoliation was rejected, prompting ACIIE and IAA to renew their exceptions of no cause of action. After its review, the Louisiana Court held that no cause of action existed for negligent spoliation of evidence. "Regardless of any alleged source of the duty, whether general or specific, public policy in our state precludes the existence of a duty to preserve evidence. Thus, there is no tort. Alternative avenues of recourse are available within Louisiana’s evidentiary, discovery, and contractual laws." View "Reynolds v. Bordelon" on Justia Law

In 2007, Clyde Snider, Jr. was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. He would later get surgery and be given a pacemaker. Following up on an unrelated issue, Snider's treating doctors found infection at the site of the pacemaker. The doctor who recommended implantation of the pacemaker was found to have rushed the decision to give Snider the pacemaker. "Except for the relatively minor complication of a hematoma, and the surgical scar after pacemaker extraction," a medical review panel found no evidence of any long term, major injury to Snider. Snider sued the treating doctor and his liability insurer for damages arising out of the doctor's alleged negligence in the implantation of the pacemaker. A jury later found that the doctor did not breach the appropriate standard of care in Snider's medical negligence action, which Snider appealed. Finding that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and was not clearly wrong, the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict. View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In December of 2002 Thomas Lowrie married Melissa Lowrie, who gave birth to two children during the marriage: A.L., born February 2003; and B.W., born May 2009. In October of 2010 the Lowries were divorced. Although the children were born during the marriage, Mr. Lowrie, believing that Stephen Wetzel was the biological father of the children, sought to disavow paternity of the children. Mr. Lowrie successfully disavowed paternity of the younger child, B.W., in January of 2011; however, his action to disavow the older child, A.L., was found to be untimely. Therefore, Mr. Lowrie remained the legal father of A.L. In September of 2012, the State Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) filed an action against Mr. Lowrie, seeking medical and child support for A.L. DCFS alleged that it was providing services for A.L., which created a cause of action in favor of the State pursuant to the State's child support enforcement law. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an alleged biological father should have been joined in a child support enforcement action, filed pursuant to LSA-R.S. 46:236.1.1 et seq. against the legally-presumed father. The juvenile court denied joinder, and the appellate court denied writs. Concluding that a biological father owes an obligation of support to his child, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Lowrie" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Louisiana law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from the claims handling by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company following an automobile accident. In 2005, Danny Kelly was injured when the insured, Henry Thomas, and he were traveling in opposite directions. Both Kelly and a witness told police that Thomas had failed to yield to oncoming traffic, but Thomas maintained he was not at fault. Kelly was taken to a hospital by ambulance and treated for a fractured femur. He remained hospitalized for approximately six days. The cost of his medical care totaled $26,803.17. Both questions related to claims that an insurer was liable for subjecting its insured to a court judgment in excess of insurance policy limits. The Louisiana Court responded to the questions: (1) A firm settlement offer was unnecessary for an insured to sustain a cause of action against an insurer for a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, because the insurer's duties to the insured can be triggered by information other than the mere fact that a third party has made a settlement offer; and (2) an insurer could be found liable under La. R.S. 22:1973(B)(1) for misrepresenting or failing to disclose facts that are not related to the insurance policy’s coverage because the statute prohibits the misrepresentation of “pertinent facts,” without restriction to facts “relating to any coverages.” View "Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Across the state, plaintiffs were filing complaints against health care providers from whom they sought treatment following automobile accidents and with whom their health care insurers had contracted reimbursement rates for the services rendered. At issue was the legality of these providers' policy of collecting or attempting to collect the undiscounted rate from the insured if a liability insurer may be liable, implemented through the filing of medical liens against plaintiffs' lawsuits and settlements pursuant to the health care provider lien statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the appellate courts of this state on the issue of whether a class action is the superior method for adjudicating actions brought pursuant to the Health Care Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act ("Balance Billing Act"). After review, the Court found plaintiffs in the Third Circuit Court of Appeal proceeded as a class, while plaintiffs in the Second Circuit Court of Appeal were denied class certification. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found the class action was superior to any other available method for a fair and efficient adjudication of the common controversy over the disputed billing and lien practices. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit. Finding all other requirements for class certification properly met, the Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Baker v. PHC-Minden, L.P." on Justia Law

Relator’s convictions stemmed from unrelated attacks on two different women in the 1990s: a 1991 attack on a victim identified as K.T.; and a 1994 attack on a victim identified as A.R. In both cases, the investigations went cold. More than a decade later, Orleans Parish law enforcement authorities began DNA testing of its voluminous stored evidence in an effort to resolve cold cases, and a Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) search identified relator as a match for biological evidence collected in both attacks. The district court sentenced him to three terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, 50 years imprisonment at hard labor, 20 years imprisonment at hard labor, and 10 years imprisonment at hard labor, all to be served consecutively to one another. The district court also sentenced relator to undergo the administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (“chemical castration”) pursuant to R.S. 14:43.6 and R.S. 15:538. Relator appealed his convictions and sentences, and additionally filed a separate writ application seeking review of the chemical castration order. In an opinion consolidating relator’s appeal and writ application, the Fourth Circuit affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences and denied his application for review of the district court’s judgment ordering relator to undergo chemical castration. Aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping were punishable by life imprisonment and as such are not subject to a prescriptive period per La.C.Cr.P. art. 571; consequently the Supreme Court affirmed relator’s convictions and sentences on those counts. However, the portion of the trial court’s sentence requiring that relator undergo chemical castration pursuant to R.S. 14:43.6 (enacted in by the legislature in 2008) was vacated. "Although some remedial regulations may be applied retroactively without violating the constitution, the chemical castration requirements of the new statute are expressly part of the punishment that a court may impose for the sex crimes enumerated in La.R.S. 14:43.6. Because the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of new laws that increase the penalty for which the crime is punishable, and because we find no clearly expressed legislative intent to apply this substantive change in the law retroactively, the portion of the court’s sentence requiring that relator submit to chemical castration is vacated." View "Louisiana ex rel. Nicholson v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff John Boudreaux filed suit against defendant Paul Cummings seeking recognition of a predial servitude/right of way by virtue of acquisitive prescription and a permanent injunction prohibiting Cummings from interfering with his use of the right of way. Specifically, Boudreaux averred that since at least 1948, he and his ancestors in title have been using a pathway and gate to cross the neighboring property that belonged to Cummings and his ancestor in title, the Weills. Testimony established that Boudreaux, his family, and farmers employed by Boudreaux used the right of way to transport farm equipment, to get to and from town for personal errands, and for convenient access to the adjacent road. In 1969, the Weills asked Boudreaux to move the right of way. Boudreaux acquiesced in the request and continued to use the pathway until 2012, when Cummings locked the gate and prevented Boudreaux’s use. Boudreaux alleged that he adversely possessed the predial servitude for thirty years and was entitled to ownership thereof. Cummings filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Boudreaux was a precarious possessor, and that acquisitive prescription never began to run in Boudreaux’s favor. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact remained. The matter went to trial and the court found precarious possession was irrelevant to a discussion of ownership of an incorporeal immovable, such as a predial servitude. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Boudreaux, ruling that the Boudreaux estate acquired a right of way over the Cummings estate by way of acquisitive prescription. Cummings appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found Boudreaux was a precarious possessor of the predial servitude, who never gave actual notice of his intent to possess on his own. Accordingly, acquisitive prescription could not and did not run in his favor. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Cummings. View "Boudreaux v. Cummings" on Justia Law