Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Property owner Crescent City Property Partners, L.L.C., and a builder, Greystar Development and Construction, LP, entered into a contract in March, 2002 for the construction of a mixed-use development in Lafayette. Alleging defects in the builder's performance, and pursuant to the arbitration clause in the construction contract, Crescent filed an arbitration claim against Greystar in 2008, also naming as a defendant Greystar's surety, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company. In response, Greystar filed a third party demand against various subcontractors. The Supreme Court granted writs in consolidated cases to consider whether the court of appeal correctly vacated the arbitration award, which had been confirmed by the district court. The court of appeal vacated the award on the basis the arbitration panel, in applying a statute of peremption incorrectly, disturbed a vested right of the plaintiff and, thus, the panel violated the plaintiff's due process rights. The court of appeal found the arbitration panel's interpretation of the law placed an impossible burden on the plaintiff, a burden the panel deemed fundamentally unfair, thereby requiring vacatur of the arbitration panel's award. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeal essentially misinterpreted the laws concerning arbitration, and, thus, erred in failing to limit its review to the factors mandating vacatur articulated in La. Rev. Stat. 9:4210. In reversing the court of appeal's decision, the Court reiterated well-settled law that otherwise fairly and honestly obtained arbitration awards may not be overturned merely for errors of fact or law. View "Crescent Property Partners, LLC v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Based on an agreement, an oilfield operator was authorized to charge certain costs against revenues prior to paying the oilfield owners. After a dispute arose, an auditor examined the oilfield operator's costs charged to the oilfield owners and found approximately $1 million as being unsubstantiated and, therefore, impermissibly charged to the owners by the operator. The arbitrator reached a different conclusion regarding what charges were permissible and awarded the owners approximately $1.6 million. Satisfied with the arbitrator's decision, the oilfield brought an action in the district court to confirm the award. The oilfield operator, however, moved to vacate the award. The operator argued that the arbitrator improperly considered certain employment documents and that the arbitration was limited in scope by the auditor's findings of the unsubstantiated charges. The district court confirmed the award and denied the operator's motion. The court of appeal affirmed, with one judge dissenting. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review as whether an accountant, serving as an arbitrator, exceeded his arbitral authority. Finding that the arbitrator acted pursuant to the authority lawfully and contractually vested in him by the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mack Energy Co. v. Expert Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2002, Warren Lester and hundreds of other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corp. and others seeking personal injury damages allegedly caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) and other hazardous materials at various Louisiana pipeyards operated by Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. (“ITCO”). A flight of several plaintiffs, including John Oleszkowicz, was severed and transferred to the 24th Judicial District Court, at which point the only remaining defendants were ITCO and Exxon. The jury considered each of the plaintiffs’ compensatory claims for increased risk of cancer, as well as a claim for exemplary damages pursuant to former La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3. During the course of trial, the district court instructed the jurors that plaintiffs could bring a “new lawsuit” in the event they actually contracted cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for the increased risk of cancer. Oleszkowicz was personally awarded $115,000 in compensatory damages. Significantly, the jury did not award exemplary damages to the plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, based on a finding that Exxon did not engage in wanton or reckless conduct in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied writs. Several months after the verdict, Oleszkowicz was diagnosed with prostate cancer. As a result, he filed the instant suit against Exxon and others, alleging his cancer stemmed from the same NORM exposure at ITCO’s pipeyard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim for punitive and exemplary damages was barred by res judicata and, if so, whether “exceptional circumstances” existed to justify not applying res judicata to bar the claim, as set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A). Although the court of appeal cited “exceptional circumstances” to justify relief from the res judicata effect of the jury’s verdict on the issue of punitive damages, the Supreme Court found no such “exceptional circumstances” exist under the facts of this case and reversed the appellate court's ruling. View "Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Canal/Claiborne, Limited owned property located at 1661 Canal Street in New Orleans. In January 1995, Canal/Claiborne entered into a lease with Stonehedge Development, L.L.C. Stonehedge entered into a sublease in June 1995 with the State of Louisiana, Department of Children and Family Services. The Department occupied the premises, remitting monthly rent payments of about $53,000.00 to Stonehedge, which in turn remitted monthly payments of about $36,000.00 to Canal/Claiborne until Hurricane Katrina struck the city in 2005. Following Katrina, the Department failed to remove its partially damaged movable property from the premises of the plaintiff’s building. During this time, the Department also failed to remit rental payments to Stonehedge. Canal/Claiborne sought remuneration for lost rental income. The issue presented in this case was whether Canal/Claiborne's quasi-contractual claim of unjust enrichment, based on the lost rental income, fell within the scope of that waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the unjust enrichment claim did not fall within the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity in contract or tort. Furthermore, the Court also found Canal/Claiborne's suit asserting a claim of unjust enrichment had not been otherwise permitted by the legislature in a “measure authorizing … immunity from suit and liability.” View "Canal/Claiborne Ltd. v. Stonehedge Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether the plaintiff was precluded from asserting a claim for punitive damages after having settled such claims relating to fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer in a prior suit, albeit with a reservation of rights as to a claim for damages related to future cancer diagnosed after the effective date of the settlement agreement. The trial court found res judicata barred the plaintiff’s subsequent claim for punitive damages relating to the diagnosis of cancer where the same alleged misconduct had given rise to the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages in the earlier litigation asserting fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer. The court of appeal granted writs and summarily reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding the plaintiff had established an exception to res judicata under La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A)(3), because he had reserved his right to bring another action based on the future diagnosis of cancer. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the punitive damages related to conduct and were separate from compensatory damages for injury. Because the plaintiff in this case specifically released all punitive and exemplary damages arising out of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, his subsequent claim for punitive damages was barred by res judicata. View "Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

This matter comes before the Louisiana Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission that respondent, Judge J. Robin Free of the 18 Judicial District Court, Parishes of West Baton Rouge, Iberville, and Pointe Coupee, be suspended without pay for thirty days and be ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $6,723.64 in hard costs. In Count 1, the complaint alleged Judge Free engaged in improper ex parte communications with counsel for a party in an environmental contamination class action lawsuit, and improperly handled a request to recuse himself from the case due to his mother’s status as a class member. In Count 2, the complaint alleged that in 2010, Judge Free accepted an invitation to participate in an all-expenses-paid trip on a private jet to a hunting ranch in Texas, extended to him by attorneys in a personal injury case before him at or near the time of settlement negotiations, including an attorney who regularly tries cases in his court, and which trip occurred shortly after the trial was concluded. The Commission received an anonymous complaint concerning this trip in August 2010. The Commission conducted an investigatory hearing, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that Judge Free violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(4), 3A(6), and 6B(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found all of the charges against Judge Free, except his failure to recuse in Count I, were proven by clear and convincing evidence and the Court accepted the recommendation of discipline of the Commission. View "In re Judge Robin Free" on Justia Law

In 2009, defendant Daniel Marshall ended a love triangle by repeatedly shooting Ronald Hodges, Jr., as Hodges ran toward Marshall, jumping off the porch of a residence. The residence belonged to Ebony Gastinell, the mother of his three children. In all, Hodges sustained five gunshot wounds: two to the back, and projectile fragment abrasions on his right shoulder, arm and hand. The police found nine spent casings scattered on the ground but did not find any firearms discarded on the scene. Following defendant’s second degree murder trial and his conviction and sentence for the lesser verdict of manslaughter, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal vacated defendant’s conviction and sentence upon finding that the prosecutor’s use of defendant’s post-arrest silence was not harmless because it undercut his plausible self-defense claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the State’s writ application, and, after reviewing the record and the applicable law, reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated defendant’s conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Marshall" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the tax sale of residential property located at 7047 Lake Willow Drive in New Orleans. In 1997, Charles and Connie Brown purchased this property pursuant to a “Cash Sale of Property.” The sale was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Records. After the Browns became delinquent on their property taxes, the property was sold at a tax sale in 2004, to Mooring Tax Asset Group. The tax collector executed a tax deed that purportedly conveyed the property to Mooring. This deed was recorded in the Orleans Parish conveyance records a year later. Presumably unaware of the tax sale, the Browns sold the property to NARA, L.L.C. pursuant to a “Cash Sale” in 2007. The sale was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Records shortly thereafter. NARA subsequently sold the property to defendant Roderick James in 2008. This sale was recorded in the Orleans Parish Conveyance Records shortly thereafter. In 2010, Mooring filed a “Petition to Quiet Title,” seeking to terminate James’ interest in the property for failure to redeem the property from the 2004 tax deed recorded in April of 2005. In June 2010, James filed exceptions and an answer to the petition, as well as a reconventional demand against the City of New Orleans, asserting that the tax sale should be nullified on several bases, including insufficient pre-sale notice and advertisement. James then filed a motion for summary judgment asserting these two bases for nullity. The trial court granted James’ motion, finding the 2004 tax sale and the 2004 tax deed were absolute nullities due to lack of sufficient pre-sale notice and for lack of sufficient pre-sale advertisement. Following the ruling, Mooring contended the declaration of nullity should be preliminary, rather than a final judgment, until it was paid costs allowed pursuant to La. R.S. 47:2291. James argued this statute could not be applied retroactively to this case, and was only applicable to tax sales that occurred after January 1, 2009. However, because Louisiana Constitution article VII, section 25(C) allowed for the delay of the effects of a tax sale nullification until certain costs are paid to the tax sale purchaser, the trial court issued a judgment allowing Mooring to submit proof of costs and James to contest costs. Mooring filed an “Affidavit of Proof of Costs Pursuant to La. R.S. 47:2221(B)(3).” James then submitted a “Motion to Contest Costs,” contending Mooring had not made a true claim for costs, and even if it had, taxes, interest, costs and penalties are not recoverable by a tax sale purchaser when the tax sale is an absolute nullity. Alternatively, James argued that if these taxes, costs and penalties are recoverable, they are not recoverable from a third-party purchaser who had no interest in the property at the time of the tax sale. After its review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court held that the tax sale purchaser was entitled to reimbursement of its costs prior to cancellation of the tax sale deed. Furthermore, the Court held that it was the current owner of the property who was responsible for payment of these costs. The Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Mooring Tax Asset Group v. James" on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant J.M. was charged with simple battery and simple criminal damage to property. On February 25, 2013, J.M. appeared to answer the petition and entered a denial of the allegations. Pursuant to La. Ch. Code art. 877, the state had ninety days from the date of the answer hearing to adjudicate the case (here, until May 26, 2013). The juvenile court set a trial date of March 26, 2013. Defendant failed to appear for trial and an arrest warrant was issued for her arrest. Service was never rendered on the defendant. On April 17, 2013, the warrant was recalled when defendant appeared in court and a new trial date of May 14, 2013 was set. On May 13, 2013, for reasons unclear from the record, the State expressly requested an extension of the adjudication deadline from May 26, 2013 to May 28, 2013 without objection. The juvenile court granted the extension and set a hearing date of May 28, 2013. On that date, the state requested a second continuance of the adjudication hearing. The juvenile court denied the state’s motion to continue, noting the State had already been granted additional time and finding no good cause to grant an additional continuance. Critically, the State did not object to or seek review of this ruling, but instead entered a nolle prosequi and dismissed the case. The same day, the State filed a new petition alleging the same delinquent acts. An answer hearing for the refiled petition was set for June 11, 2013. On June 11, 2013, the record reflected service was not made on the defendant and a new hearing date was set for June 25, 2013. On that date, the juvenile court judge was absent and the matter was delayed until July 16, 2013. On that date, 141 days from the original answer hearing, J.M. appeared in court to answer the refiled petition. J.M. once again denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the state violated the time limitations found in Louisiana Children’s Code Article 877. The juvenile court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. J.M. noticed intent to seek review of that ruling and appealed. The court of appeal granted defendant’s writ application and reversed the ruling of the juvenile court, dismissing the case on the basis that the state failed to adjudicate the matter within the time limitations provided in the Children’s Code. The State appealed the court of appeal’s decision, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal ruling. View "Louisiana in the interest of J.M." on Justia Law

This class action arose out of the termination of approximately 7,600 former teachers and other permanent employees of the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the State of Louisiana’s subsequent takeover of Orleans Parish schools. Although the district court denied defendants’ exceptions of res judicata, a five judge panel of the court of appeal unanimously found that res judicata ordinarily would apply to the facts of this case, but that exceptional circumstances barred its application. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted two writ applications to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiffs’ claims against the OPSB and/or the State defendants, and, if not, whether the OPSB and/or the State defendants violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights in relation to the plaintiffs’ terminations. The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that res judicata applied but found no exceptional circumstances that would preclude its application. Furthermore, the Court found that, even if res judicata did not apply to certain parties’ claims, neither the OPSB nor the State defendants violated plaintiffs’ due process rights. View "Oliver v. Orleans Parish School Board" on Justia Law