Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In lieu of undergoing a formal audit, Louisiana law requires justices of the peace to file a sworn annual financial statement with the Louisiana Legislative Auditor. Officials who fail to file timely financial statements are notified that their names have been placed on a noncompliance list. According to a database maintained by the Legislative Auditor, respondent failed to file her annual financial statement for 2007, 2008, 2009. As of May 2013, when the hearing was held in this matter, respondent was still out of compliance for those years. In December 2010, the Chief Executive Officer of the Commission authorized the Office of Special Counsel to open a file regarding respondent based on the news report from a New Orleans television station that respondent's name had been placed on the Auditor's list. The Supreme Court found that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to comply with the filing requirement of La. Rev. Stat. 24:514, thereby subjecting her to discipline. Respondent was ordered suspended without pay for twelve months, with six months deferred conditioned on her filing the requisite sworn annual financial statements for years 2007, 2008, and 2009 within three months of the date of this judgment. Respondent was further ordered to reimburse and pay to the Commission $246.70 in costs. View "In re Justice of the Peace Meyers" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the lower courts’ interpretation of portions of a written mineral agreement. The agreement was prepared by a mineral leaseholder and ostensibly conveyed to an exploration company an “exclusive option to sublease” at least 15 percent of the leaseholder’s mineral rights. The lower courts interpreted the agreement as imposing an obligation on the exploration company to execute the sublease rather than simply allowing the exploration company the right to execute the sublease. Because the exploration company did not execute such a sublease, the lower courts awarded damages to the leaseholder for breach of contract. When the Court granted certiorari review, the lower courts had awarded to the leaseholder other damages, related to the exploration company’s obligation to execute a mineral sublease. The Supreme Court determined that the lower courts erred in ruling that the exploration company was obligated by the agreement to sublease mineral rights. Instead, the Court found the agreement afforded the exploration company a non-binding option to sublease (for which the exploration company paid $1.4 million), but that if the exploration company exercised the non-binding option, it was then obligated to sublease at least 15 percent of the leaseholder’s rights described in the agreement. Accordingly, the damage award on the breach of contract claim for failing to sublease at least 15 percent of the leaseholder’s mineral rights was reversed. However, the Court also found the exploration company breached its obligation to complete a seismic survey, and the Court affirmed the corresponding award of damage. Because the record did not support a finding that the exploration company acted in bad faith, we examine the effects of a contractual prohibition against consequential damages that the lower courts refused to apply based on those courts’ findings of bad faith. Because of the court of appeal's error, any meaningful review of the merits of the exploration company’s argument that its reconventional demand for improper use and sharing of its seismic data was improperly dismissed. The case was therefore remanded to the court of appeal the question of the propriety of that dismissal and, as that court then deems necessary, the question of whether the record supports the exploration company’s request for relief, or whether remanding to the district court for the taking of additional evidence is required. View "Olympia Minerals, LLC v. HS Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1998, Jerry Lee Baldwin entered into a written agreement with the Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System to serve as the head football coach at the University of Southwestern Louisiana, now University of Louisiana at Lafayette (UL). The contract provided that Baldwin’s employment with UL would last until January 31, 2003. By letter dated November 27, 2001, Baldwin was “relieved of [his] duties” as UL’s head coach effective November 26, 2001, after winning only six of twenty-seven games (an 18% win record). Baldwin continued to receive his full monthly salary and other employee benefits from UL including health insurance, accrual of leave time, and accrual of retirement credits for the remainder of the contract term. Baldwin sued the Board over the contract. Defendants sought review of the court of appeal’s determination that the coach’s contract had been terminated, which triggered a contractual obligation to provide notice. Interpreting the contract in its entirety, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in finding that the failure of notice constituted a breach of contract under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the summary judgment rendered by the trial court, which dismissed the coach’s breach of contract claim against defendants. View "Baldwin v. Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cynthia Holliday alleged she was unlawfully terminated from her employment with the State while on leave in 2009, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993's (FMLA) “self-care” provision. The State filed an Exception of No Cause of Action on the basis of sovereign immunity, which the district court denied. The Fourth Circuit denied Supervisory Writs. After its review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred as matter of law in denying the State’s Exception of No Cause of Action. "While Louisiana may have waived sovereign immunity with respect to some claims, La. Const. art. 1 section 26 makes it clear the State has not waived its sovereignty within the federal system." The Louisiana Supreme Court found the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining the State had elected to waive its sovereign immunity for purposes of the FMLA. View "Holliday v. Board of Supervisors of LSU Agricultural & Mechanical College" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was whether defendant Paul Massey was eligible to receive “good time” credits when the law changed after the offenses were committed, eliminating Massey’s eligibility to earn early release. In 2006, the Legislature amended the statute that gave inmates the capacity to earn early release from their prison sentence in exchange for good behavior and the performance of work or self-improvement activities. The amendment significantly narrowed the class of inmates qualified to receive good time credits, excluding from eligibility, as pertinent here, those convicted of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile or molestation of a juvenile. Massey committed both felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and attempted molestation of a juvenile in 1994. His victims, however, did not report his crimes to the authorities until 2004, and a jury did not convict Massey of these offenses until 2007. The Supreme Court was asked to decide which version of the good time statute applied to Massey - the law in effect at the time he committed his crimes or the law in effect at the time of his conviction, which would have denied him early release regardless of his demonstrated good behavior. Because the rescission of good time eligibility creates a significant risk of prolonging his incarceration and increases the severity of Massey’s sentence by altering the terms and conditions under which he must serve his penalty, the Supreme Court found application of the amended law would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. Applying the law in effect at the time the offenses were committed, the Court found Massey was eligible to receive good time credits and is entitled to have his time recomputed under the statute before it was amended. View "Massey v. Louisiana Dept. of Safety & Corrections" on Justia Law

The district court found that House Bill 974 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which was enacted as Act 1 of 2012 (Act 1), violated the single object requirement for legislative bills as provided for in La. Const. art. III, section 15(A). Act 1 of 2012 amended, reenacted and repealed various statutes in Title 17. Looking first at the title, and then to the body of Act 1, the Supreme Court concluded that the subject of the act is elementary and secondary education, and the object of the act was improving elementary and secondary education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness. After examining the numerous provisions of Act 1, the Court determined that "they all have a natural connection and are incidental and germane to that one object." In order to overturn a legislative enactment pursuant to the one-object rule, “the objections must be grave and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable.” In this case, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs the Louisiana Federation of Teachers, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Foundation of Teachers, Nellie Joyce Meriman, and Kevin Joseph DeHart, failed to establish that such a grave and palpable conflict existed between Act 1 and the one-object rule of La. Const. art. III, section 15. Because the district court pretermitted consideration of the other constitutional arguments raised by plaintiffs, i.e., that Act 1 violated due process rights pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 2, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the case was remanded for consideration of those issues. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

This case has its roots in 2011, where, at approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, Royce Bufkin, Jr. was walking through the French Quarter from a jewelry store on Royal Street to a wine shop on Chartres Street, via Conti Street. Outside a building under renovation at 622 Conti Street, Bufkin encountered a construction barrier blocking the sidewalk, which directed pedestrians to use the sidewalk on the other side of the street. At this location, there was also a large construction dumpster placed on several adjacent on-street parking spaces by Shamrock Construction Co., Inc., in connection with renovations it had contracted to make at 622 Conti Street. While attempting to cross the street by the dumpster, Bufkin was hit by a bicyclist and injured. At the time of the accident, the bicyclist, was working in the course and scope of his employment as a deliveryman for Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC d/b/a Felipe’s Taqueria Restaurant, was traveling in the wrong direction (away from the river) on Conti Street. Bufkin had stopped before crossing Conti, next to the dumpster, to allow two cars to pass, but failed to look to his right before crossing the street, and he did not see the bicyclist approaching. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether Shamrock breached any legal duty owed to a pedestrian crossing a street next to the contractor’s dumpster, who was then struck by an oncoming bicyclist. After a thorough review of the record presented, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the dumpster was obvious and apparent, and not unreasonably dangerous; thus, there was no duty to warn of the clearly visible obstruction, and the district court erred in failing to grant summary judgment dismissing the contractor. View "BUFKIN, JR. v. FELIPE'S LOUISIANA, LLC, ET AL." on Justia Law

L.D. was charged with the commission of a felony-grade delinquent act of unauthorized use of a movable. Although La.Ch.C. art. 854(A) required in this instance that L.D. appear to answer the delinquency petition within five days of filing because he was continued in custody, the district court set the answer hearing for the next available court date dedicated to juvenile matters, 27 days later. L.D. appeared at that time, objected to the untimeliness of the hearing, and asked for his release from custody and for dismissal of the delinquency petition. The juvenile judge found, consistent with a policy of that court, that the court’s scheduling constraints constituted "good cause" for the delay under La.Ch.C. art. 854(C). The court therefore declined to dismiss the petition and release L.D. from custody, and the juvenile did not seek immediate review of that ruling. The court adjudicated L.D. delinquent 21 days later, within the 30 days from the answer hearing afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877(A). On appeal, L.D. contended that his adjudication hearing was nevertheless untimely and that the petition should therefore have been dismissed because each step in delinquency adjudication process "should be seen as carefully and closely placed, like dominoes in a row, and that by wrongly delaying the answer hearing, the juvenile court judge triggered a cascade, a rippling effect, that ended in an adjudication that should be viewed as untimely as well." The court of appeal found that the juvenile judge erred in denying L.D.’s motion for release based on failure to timely hold the answer hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e [. . .] agree with the court of appeal majority that the legislature did not subscribe to the rippling effect advocated by L.D., such that the slightest perturbation in the steady march of various time limits through the process results inexorably in the dismissal of a delinquency petition. The court of appeal noted, and all parties agree, that La.Ch.C. art. 854 specifies no remedy when the time afforded for an answer hearing is exceeded without good cause. The provisions of the Children’s Code governing delinquency proceedings otherwise contain several explicit time limits. [. . .] Only when the time afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877 to commence the delinquency adjudication following the answer hearing is exceeded must the court dismiss the petition at the request of the juvenile." View "Louisiana in the Interest of L.D." on Justia Law

Maurice Hawley was charged with driving under the influence after a breath test demonstrated his blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the state’s introduction into evidence of the certification form attesting to the inspection and maintenance of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, and the certification form attesting to the qualifications of the maintenance technician who inspected, maintained and certified the machine, without producing the testimony of the technician, violated Hawley’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Finding these we hold these forms nontestimonial, and thus not subject to Confrontation Clause requirements, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court's conviction. View "Louisiana v. Hawley" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Perkins argued on appeal of his conviction for possession of a "shank" by a convicted felon, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that ultimately convicted him. The district court sentenced defendant to fifteen years of hard labor, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the district court erred in its jury instructions. The State appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable laws implicated by the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the district court and by vacating defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Perkins" on Justia Law