Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted the defendant Eric Mickelson, of one count of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. In his direct appeal, defendant raised numerous assignments of error, including the failure of the district court to sustain his challenge for cause of a venire member and the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit to defendant's argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence. However, "constrained by statutory requirements," the Court found the district court erred in failing to excuse a prospective juror for cause. Thus, the Court reversed and vacated the conviction and death sentence, and remanded for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Mickelson" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with one count of simple burglary of a vehicle. The issue on appeal, presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the District Court's failure to observe the strictures of a rule jurisprudentially created by the Fourth Circuit in "Louisiana v. Knighten," (609 So.2d 950 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992)), constituted a violation of the defendant's equal protection and due process rights under "Batson v. Kentucky," (106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986)), requiring a reversal of the jury's guilty verdict. Following voir dire, defendant raised Batson challenges relative to three of the State's peremptory strikes. After hearing the State's proffered race-neutral reasons, the District Court denied defendant's Batson challenges. Citing the State's failure to follow the so-called "Knighten rule," the Court of Appeal reversed defendant's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court found the "Knighten rule" undermined the well-established Batson framework the Louisiana Court adopted and repeatedly applied. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal, reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence, and overruled Knighten insofar as it establishes the "Knighten rule." View "Louisiana v. Bender" on Justia Law

A property owner/lessor filed suit against the City of Marksville seeking to recover damages for the City's denial of a retail alcoholic beverage permit to the lessee of its property. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court erred in finding liability on the part of the City and awarding damages. In particular, the Court considered the City's contention that an error occurred in denying its peremptory exception of no cause of action. Finding merit in the City's claim that the property owner failed to state a cause of action for interference with a contractual relation caused by the denial of a liquor permit to its lessee, the Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the City. View "MAW Enterprises, LLC v. City of Marksville" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether a plaintiff had a private right of action for damages against a health care provider under the Health Care and Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act. Plaintiff Yana Anderson alleged that she was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. She received medical treatment at an Ochsner facility. Anderson was insured by UnitedHealthcare. Pursuant to her insurance contract, Anderson paid premiums to UnitedHealthcare in exchange for discounted health care rates. These reduced rates were available pursuant to a member provider agreement, wherein UnitedHealthcare contracted with Ochsner to secure discounted charges for its insureds. Anderson presented proof of insurance to Ochsner in order for her claims to be submitted to UnitedHealthcare for payment on the agreed upon reduced rate. However, Ochsner refused to file a claim with her insurer. Instead, Ochsner sent a letter to Anderson’s attorney, asserting a medical lien for the full amount of undiscounted charges on any tort recovery Anderson received for the underlying automobile accident. Anderson filed a putative class action against Ochsner, seeking, among other things, damages arising from Ochsner’s billing practices. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the legislature intended to allow a private right of action under the statute. Additionally, the Court found an express right of action was available under La. R.S. 22:1874(B) based on the assertion of a medical lien. View "Anderson v. Ochsner Health System" on Justia Law

In 2012, the people voted to amend Article I, Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution (effective December 10, 2012), which provided: "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny." Prior to its amendment this article provided that, "[t]he right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the person." Some arrested or convicted of crimes involving firearms have attempted to show that the laws under which they were charged did not withstand strict scrutiny and were thus unconstitutional. In consolidated cases, the Supreme Court rejected those arguments. "Our law proscribing the possession of firearms by convicted felons is not affected by the amendment and withstands a strict scrutiny analysis. Such laws are effective, time-tested, and easily understandable, and do not violate the constitution. Common sense and the public safety allow no other result." View "Louisiana v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the state’s application to review the decision of the First Circuit affirming the district court’s order of expungement entered in respondent’s case following the court’s set aside of his misdemeanor conviction and sentence for domestic abuse battery with child endangerment in violation of La.R.S.14:35.3(I), and dismissal of the prosecution under La.C.Cr.P. art. 894. The district court entered the order, and the court of appeal affirmed, notwithstanding La.R.S. 44:9(A)(5)(b), which provided that “[n]o person shall be entitled to an expungement if the misdemeanor conviction arose from circumstances involving a sexual act or act of domestic violence.” Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal and vacated the expungement order. View "Louisiana v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

"This procedurally complex writ" concerned the tolling of prescription in a class action entitled "Fulford v. Transport Services Co." (Fulford/Abram), filed in Louisiana state court, then removed to federal court where class certification was denied. After class certification was denied and the case was still pending in federal court, other putative class members filed individual claims in a Louisiana state court, entitled "Smith v. Transport Services Co." (Smith). The specific issue this case presented was whether Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 596A(3) suspended prescription for putative class members, plaintiffs herein, when a class action filed in a Louisiana state court was removed to federal court. The Louisiana Court found that under Article 596 prescription was suspended for the putative class members (Smith et al.) upon the filing of the Fulford/Abram class action in a Louisiana state court, and none of the three triggering events contained in Article 596 to resumed the tolling of prescription occurred. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and overruled defendants’ exception of prescription. View "Smith v. Transport Services Co. of Illinois" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the district court properly ordered the defendants to register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A). The more precisely: whether the defendants, who, as adults, entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile for conduct that occurred when the defendants were themselves under the age of 14 years old, had to register as sex offenders under the statute even though they would not have been required to register as such had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court at the time they committed the offenses. The Supreme Court found under the plain language of the statute that the defendants qualified as “[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to … a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541…” and, therefore, must register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. I.C.S." on Justia Law

Shelter Mutual Property Insurance Company retained Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. to provide an engineering evaluation and expert witness services in connection with its defense of litigation resulting from a claim for hurricane damages brought by a corporation insured by Shelter. Rimkus sent Shelter a letter confirming the engagement and indicating Rimkus' services were subject to “Terms and Conditions” attached to the letter. The “Terms and Conditions” included a forum selection clause which required venue for any suits arising out of the contract to be in Harris County, Texas. When a dispute arose, Shelter filed suit against Rimkus in the 15th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette. Rimkus filed an exception of improper venue, arguing the forum selection clause included in its “Terms and Conditions” required suit to be brought in Texas. Shelter opposed the exception, arguing it never agreed to the unilateral “Terms and Conditions” and thus they were not part of the agreement between the parties.The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeal regarding whether forum selection clauses were per se violative of public policy in Louisiana. Answering that question in the negative, it reversed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc." on Justia Law

An insurance company appealed a decision on the issue of coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy. The appellate court found that, under the Direct Action Statute, an insurer could not use the policy’s claim-reporting requirement to deprive an injured third party of a right that vests at the time of injury. After considering the applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the reporting provision in a claims-made-and-reported policy was a permissible limitation on the insurer’s liability as to third parties and did not violate the Direct Action Statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the court of appeal’s decision relating to the claim of the injured third party, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, finding no coverage. View "Gorman v. City of Opelousas" on Justia Law