Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether defects in load-bearing walls were a result of "any defect" due to noncompliance with the buildings standards subject to a one year peremptive period, or whether they constituted a "major structural defect" subject to a peremptive period of five years. This case stemmed from damages caused by a home flooding. The District Court found the defects in the four exterior load-bearing walls constituted a major structural defect under the Act to which the five-year warranty period applied and awarded plaintiff Barbara Shaw damages. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the plaintiff's claim was for a defect in workmanship subject to a one year peremptive period. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the record supported the failure of the load-bearing walls affected the "load-bearing functions to the extent the home becomes unsafe, unsanitary, or is otherwise unlivable," as provided by La. Rev. Stat. 9:3143. Thus, it constituted a major structural defect and the five-year warranty applied. View "Shaw v. Acadian Builders & Contractors, LLC" on Justia Law

Benjamin and Keri Fidelak filed a petition for damages in Caddo Parish district court (a court of proper venue) against Foreign & Classic Auto Centre, Inc., a small, independent repair shop in Shreveport, which specialized in the repair of high end foreign automobiles. The Fidelaks claimed that Foreign & Classic sold them a defective engine for their 2004 Land Rover. In response, Foreign & Classic raised numerous defenses and asserted a third party demand against British Parts International (BPI) for reimbursement and indemnification because BPI sold the engine to Foreign & Classic. BPI is headquartered in Houston, Texas, and conducts business nationwide. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the enforceability of a forum selection clause. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and held that the forum selection clause at issue here was not enforceable because a third party defendant may not object to venue where the principal action has been instituted in the proper venue. View "Fidelak v. Holmes European Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Within days of his twenty-seventh birthday, Clyde Snider, Jr., was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. A few months later, after complaining of chest pains, he went to a second doctor and different hospital facility. He would later receive a pacemaker. Snider sustained an unrelated injury to the area of his pacemaker, when on his return home from the hospital, his two-year-old daughter ran to greet him, jumped into his arms, and struck his chest which caused an injury to the surgical site. Returning to the hospital where he was first treated for cardiac troubles, Snider's treating physician recommended that the pacemaker be removed when he found symptoms of infection at the pacemaker site. The next day the pacemaker was removed. Subsequently, Snider sued Dr. Robin Yue, the physician who recommended he receive the pacemaker. The medical review panel concluded that Dr. Yue had failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care and that his conduct was a factor in the "minor resultant damage." The case was tried before a jury, which ruled in favor of Dr. Yue, finding that Snider had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Yue breached the applicable standard of care. Snider's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for new trial was denied by the district court judge, who stated that the jury verdict was not clearly contrary to the law and evidence. The appellate court reversed and ruled in favor of Snider and against the doctor on the issue of liability and remanded the matter to the district court to allow the parties an opportunity to complete the record as to damages. The doctor contended on appeal that the appellate court erred: in failing to adhere to the proper standard of review; in substituting its judgment on the weight of evidence, evaluation of facts, and determinations of credibility for those of the jury; in reversing the jury verdict on liability; and in its interpretation and application of the Uniform Consent Law. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because the jury concluded Snider gave informed consent in this matter, Dr. Yue did not breach the standard of care. The appellate court attributed legal error to the jury's finding because Dr. Yue did not comply with Subsection (E) of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.40. However, as compliance with the requirement of informed consent was alternatively attainable under Subsection (A) or (C), the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred. The appellate court should have applied a manifest error standard of review to the jury's factual finding that informed consent was given in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court decision, and remanded the case back to that court with instructions to consider and rule upon Snider's assignments of error. . View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This matter stemmed from the failure of Raymond Thomas, Jr. (a candidate for the office of justice of the peace) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XL. The hearing officer found that Mr. Thomas failed to file his 2012 personal financial disclosure statement timely, and that he acted willfully and knowingly in failing to comply with the financial disclosure rule. The hearing officer recommended that Mr. Thomas be ordered to pay a penalty of $500.00 and to reimburse the Judiciary Commission for costs. The Supreme Court agreed with the hearing officer's decision after a review of the case, and affirmed the officer's decision. View "In re Raymond Thomas, Jr. Justice of the Peace Candidate Ward 1, Assumption Parish" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Smith appealed his conviction and sentence for distribution of cocaine. He argued that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction. However, after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred, and reinstated defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Louisiana v. Smith" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether "Miller v. Alabama," (567 U.S. __ (2012)) applied retroactively in state collateral proceedings. Defendant Darryl Tate, whose mandatory life-without-parole sentence for a second-degree murder he committed as a juvenile became final in 1984, filed a motion seeking resentencing in light of Miller. The District Court denied his motion, but the Court of Appeal granted writs, remanding the matter for a sentencing hearing. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to address the retroactivity of Miller to those juvenile homicide convictions final at the time Miller was rendered. Upon review, the Louisiana Court found Miller did not apply retroactively in cases on collateral review as it merely set forth a new rule of criminal constitutional procedure, which is neither substantive nor implicative of the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and reinstated the judgment of the District Court. View "Louisiana v. Tate" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2012, defendant Rosa Lugo Marquez was charged by bill of information with being an alien student and/or a nonresident alien who operated a motor vehicle in the parish of Lafayette without documentation demonstrating that she was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Marquez" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether homeschooling of children born of the marriage was a factor the trial court could consider when awarding final support. The District Court found homeschooling was not a factor legally considered in the determination of final support. In a plurality opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court was charged pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 112 with considering all relevant factors in determining the amount and duration of final support, thus the homeschooling of children born of the marriage could be a relevant factor in the determination of such support. Therefore, the Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts as to this issue only and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Rhymes v. Rhymes" on Justia Law

On August 2, 2012, defendant Bonifacio Ramirez was arrested during a traffic stop in for operating a motor vehicle without documentation demonstrating that he was lawfully present in the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether La. R.S. 14:100.13 (which punished as a felony the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien without documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States), was preempted by federal law under the Supreme Court's recent decision in "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)). Finding that the statute operated in the field of alien registration and was, therefore, preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Arizona," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and rendered judgment granting defendant's motion to quash. View "Louisiana v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Louisiana legislature enacted a series of laws titled "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways." One of the statutes proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle by an alien student or nonresident alien who does not possess documentation demonstrating lawful presence in the United States. Violation is a felony that carried a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year, with or without hard labor. Following a nolo contendere plea to the charge of violating La. R.S. 14:100.13, in which he reserved the right to appeal a claim that the statute was preempted by federal law, defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and sentence, holding that La. R.S. 14:100.13 was indeed preempted. After review of the relevant law, the Supreme Court found that based on "Arizona v. United States," (132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012)), La. R.S. 14:100.13 was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeal. View "Louisiana v. Sarrabea" on Justia Law