Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Luann Landry (St. Bernard Parish, Ward E) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Landry failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Landry was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00, plus costs of $554.00.View "In re Justice of the Peace Luann Landry" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court or the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a putative class of utility ratepayers in the City of Opelousas against Cleco Corporation and Cleco Power, LLC (Cleco). The ratepayers sought reimbursement for alleged overcharges for electricity for a period of nearly twenty years, based on a franchise agreement Cleco signed with the City of Opelousas in 1991. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and sustained Cleco's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this is primarily a rate case that must be decided, in the first instance, by the LPSC. Furthermore, the Court found that LA. CONST. art. IV, section 21 (C) was inapplicable, which excludes from the LPSC's exclusive authority a public utility owned, operated, or regulated by a political subdivision, as this case did not involve a municipally-owned public utility company. Accordingly, the rulings of the lower courts were vacated and the ratepayers' claims were dismissed.View "Opelousas Trust Authority v. Cleco Corporation" on Justia Law

by
This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers (Point Coupee Parish, District 4) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Myers failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Myers was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500.00. View "In re Justice of the Peace Stacie Myers" on Justia Law

by
The issue in this matter was whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. Upon review of the applicable legislative history of the statute in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriff’s office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. The decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves " on Justia Law

by
This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet (Calcasieu Parish, Ward 6) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record established by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Threet failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting him to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Threet was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $2,500.00, plus costs of $253.20. In addition, Justice of the Peace Threet was ordered to file his financial disclosure statement for 2010. View "In Re: Justice of the Peace Thomas Threet" on Justia Law

by
The Louisiana Supreme Court accepted a certified question presented by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. The question presented sought "binding instructions from the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the correct usage of a defendant's name (and other close relatives) in cases in which the victim is a minor related to the defendant." The Supreme Court concluded that the controlling statutory authority mandated confidentiality of the victim's identity in certain cases, but does not extend this protection to any other persons. View "Louisiana v. R. W. B." on Justia Law

by
In "Louisiana v. Duheart," the Supreme Court reversed part of the district court's judgment that La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1) was unconstitutionally vague, and remanded the case for reconsideration of defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant filed a second motion to suppress, again arguing La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1) was unconstitutionally vague. The district court again granted the motion and held the statute unconstitutionally vague as applied in defendant's case. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court again held the district court erred in its analysis: the evidence defendant wanted suppressed had no bearing on the outcome of the motion and thus was not a justiciable controversy for review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court to the extent that it suppressed evidence based on La.R.S. 32:101(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. Duheart" on Justia Law

by
The plaintiffs prevailed in their action under the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The district court rendered a fee award, but reduced the requested number of billable hours by 20%, set an hourly rate, and declined to enhance the overall award. The plaintiffs and the defendants both appealed. The court of appeal amended the award for purposes of the lodestar calculation to increase the number of billable hours to the amount requested and the prevailing hourly rate to $265. The court of appeal further enhanced the fee award, finding the case to be "rare" and "exceptional" based upon the results achieved and the protracted and highly-contested litigation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s fee award. The Court therefore reversed the ruling of the court of appeal and reinstated the judgment of the district court. View "Covington v. McNeese State University" on Justia Law

by
In a declaratory judgment action before the Supreme Court, the issue for review concerned the validity of two legislative instruments enacted during the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99) and 2012 La. Acts 2 (Act 2 or "Act"), each of which addressed funding and a mechanism for the state to pay for the tuition costs of elementary and secondary school students physically attending, or otherwise undertaking individual course work, from nonpublic schools. SCR 99 and Act 2 were challenged on constitutional grounds, the underlying argument was that those legislative instruments diverted funds constitutionally reserved for public schools. Upon review of the record, the instruments themselves and the constitutional provisions at issue, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that once funds are dedicated to the state’s Minimum Foundation Program for public education, the constitution prohibits those funds from being expended on the tuition costs of nonpublic schools and nonpublic entities. Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court found the procedures employed to enact SCR 99 violated the constitution inasmuch as that legislative instrument was intended to have the effect of law, but several requirements for enacting law were not observed. Furthermore, after severing the unconstitutional provisions of Act 2, the Court held that Act 2 did not violate the constitution's "one-object" rule. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

by
In this custody dispute, the trial court ordered a change in custody, finding the father satisfied the requirements of "Bergeron v. Bergeron" by establishing that any harm caused by a modification of a 2004 custody decree would be substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child. The trial court’s ruling was reversed by the court of appeal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the correctness of the court of appeal’s ruling. Because the Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in modifying custody, it reversed the appellate court and reinstated the ruling of the trial court. View "Mulkey v. Mulkey" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law