Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
Kerry Moseley and Derek Pociask were married and had two children. They separated ten years later, and shortly thereafter, were granted a divorce. But several months before the judgment of divorce, Moseley had another child. Pociask filed a petition to disavow paternity of the latest child. In her exception, Moseley argued that Pociask did not file his petition to disavow within a year of the child's birth. The district court overruled the exception. The parties entered a consent agreement whereby the DNA of the child was tested. The test results revealed Pociask was not the biological father. The district court granted Pociask's motion for summary judgment allowing him to disavow paternity of the child. The appellate court reversed, finding the disavowal action prescribed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its analysis, reversed and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Pociask v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
by
The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a non-health care provider could be a joint tortfeasor with a health care provider being sued for medical malpractice. The non-health care provider in this case was an answering service tasked with relaying calls from a patient to their doctor after office hours. The patient learned that the service failed to convey his messages to his doctor despite the doctor giving the service explicit instructions to call. The patient sued the doctor for malpractice, and included the answering service. The service moved to dismiss, claiming that it could not be considered a joint tortfeasor under the statute under which the doctor had been sued. Finding that the clear language of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) applied to filing suit against the non-health care provider, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings which granted and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the non-health care provider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs owned an undivided five-sixths interest of land on which they executed an oil and gas lease to Prestige Exploration, Inc. Plaintiffs ownership interests were managed by Regions Bank who helped negotiate the terms of the lease. Prestige acquired the lease on behalf of Defendant Matador Resources Company. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the extension of that lease. Plaintiffs sought to rescind or reform the extension agreement to make it applicable only to a portion of their property. After several preliminary partial summary judgment rulings, a jury found in favor of Defendant for the extension to cover the entirety of Plaintiffs' land interest. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reformed the lease to extend only to the portion of land for which Plaintiffs asked. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiffs were precluded from rescinding the agreement on "excusable error." Further, the Court found no manifest error in the district court proceedings. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment in its entirety. View "Peironnet v. Matador Resources Co." on Justia Law

by
Mother Misty Hernandez appealed a family court order denying her motion for permission to move to another state with the child she shared with Father Brandon Jenkins. Upon review of the family court matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the family court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the proper legal standard with regard to Mother's motion and by denying it. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the Mother. View "Hernandez v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

by
In October 2003, insurance agency Plaintiff Kennedy, Lewis, Renton & Associates, Inc. ("KLR"), secured a property insurance policy with Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation ("Citizens") for Plaintiff Kirk Prest on property located in Boothville, Plaquemines Parish. Hurricane Ivan damaged Plaintiffs' buildings in 2004. Plaintiffs subsequently made repairs and undertook new construction on the property insured by Citizens. Because they were penalized for being underinsured for their losses in Hurricane Ivan, Plaintiffs wanted to ensure their property was properly covered by sufficient amounts of insurance in the future. The total amount of insurance coverage on the property was $350,000. As each phase of reconstruction and expansion was completed, Plaintiffs requested increased coverage on their buildings. There was a mistake on the form sent requesting increased coverage, in that the words "renew policy" were typed in rather than "increasing coverage." However, the comments immediately below correctly described the increased amounts of coverage on the buildings requested by the policy holder. Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana on August 29, 2005, eleven days after an August 2005 policy change request. At that time, Plaintiffs believed they had a total of $540,000 in insurance coverage on their property. The KMR insurance agent assisting Plaintiffs in requesting the coverage increases also believed Plaintiffs had coverage in that amount. In May 2006, Citizens sent a letter to Plaintiffs, advising them the policy had been reviewed and the requested increases in the policy limits would not be honored. According to Citizens, Plaintiffs only had the original $350,000 worth of coverage on their property. Plaintiffs filed suit against Citizens, seeking payment of the full policy amounts, including the amount of the requested coverage increases, attorney fees and penalties. In the alternative, Plaintiffs also sought recovery from KLR. After engaging in pretrial discovery, Plaintiffs and Citizens entered into a settlement agreement in late 2008. Without admitting liability, Citizens settled the claims against it for a total of $540,000 from Citizens. After trial on the merits against KLR, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, finding KLR was negligent in its handling of its clients' requests for coverage increases. KLR appealed both the finding of liability and the award of damages. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding of negligence in part, holding there was manifest error in the trial court's finding the insurance agency failed to exercise reasonable diligence with regard to a July 2005 request for increased coverage. The Supreme Court granted KLR's writ, primarily to determine the correctness of the trial court's award of general damages. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding general damages and reversed that portion of the damage award. View "Prest v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

by
This matter came before the Supreme Court following the granting of motions for summary judgment in the district court. The district court dismissed the claims of an electrical utility company for indemnity from contractors involved with repairs to a building to which the utility company provided electrical service. An employee of one (or more) of the repair contractors was injured when another employee working on a scaffold contacted an overhead power line with a metal object, thereby conducting electricity through the scaffolding. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court found that the Overhead Power Line Safety Act allowed for indemnity to be provided by contractors who violate the act, to an electrical utility company. However, based on the record the Court did not reach the issue of whether indemnity was actually owed by any party or was precluded by any party's defense. Therefore the Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Moreno v. Entergy Corporation" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
by
This writ application involved the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), and whether the running of the statutory ninety (90) day grace period in which prescription is suspended in a medical malpractice case begins when a plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint is dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman, or when plaintiff is notified that his complaint has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that the 90 day grace period begins to run from the date of dismissal. Because plaintiff failed to file her petition for damages within this 90 day period, her claim was dismissed. View "Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center" on Justia Law

by
This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Luann Landry (St. Bernard Parish, Ward E) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Landry failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Landry was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00, plus costs of $554.00.View "In re Justice of the Peace Luann Landry" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court or the Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a putative class of utility ratepayers in the City of Opelousas against Cleco Corporation and Cleco Power, LLC (Cleco). The ratepayers sought reimbursement for alleged overcharges for electricity for a period of nearly twenty years, based on a franchise agreement Cleco signed with the City of Opelousas in 1991. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court and sustained Cleco's exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction because this is primarily a rate case that must be decided, in the first instance, by the LPSC. Furthermore, the Court found that LA. CONST. art. IV, section 21 (C) was inapplicable, which excludes from the LPSC's exclusive authority a public utility owned, operated, or regulated by a political subdivision, as this case did not involve a municipally-owned public utility company. Accordingly, the rulings of the lower courts were vacated and the ratepayers' claims were dismissed.View "Opelousas Trust Authority v. Cleco Corporation" on Justia Law

by
This matter arose from a recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana regarding the failure of Justice of the Peace Stacie P. Myers (Point Coupee Parish, District 4) to comply with the financial reporting requirements of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXXIX for calendar year 2010.Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Justice of the Peace Myers failed to comply with the financial disclosure requirement thereby subjecting her to a civil monetary penalty. Justice of the Peace Myers was ordered to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $1,500.00. View "In re Justice of the Peace Stacie Myers" on Justia Law