Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In February of 2009, a vehicle driven by Antoine Ellis ran a stop sign and struck a vehicle owned and operated by Ann Bernard. Norell Bernard and Andrea Bernard were guest passengers in Ann Bernard's vehicle at the time of the accident. Mr. Ellis was uninsured, and Ann, Norell and Andrea Bernard all filed suit against Imperial (Ann Bernard's insurer) for UM coverage. While Imperial did not dispute its named insured Ann Bernard was entitled to UM coverage, it filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Norell and Andrea Bernard's claims on the basis that the guest passengers were not residents of Ann Bernard's household, and therefore did not meet the definition of "insured person" under the terms of the insurance policy for UM coverage. Imperial challenged the court rulings that denied the insurer summary judgment on that issue. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs were liability insureds under the Imperial policy and therefore entitled to UM coverage. Thus, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts, denying Imperial's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Bernard v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law

The state filed a delinquency petition in the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans charging Defendant with distribution of heroin in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1). After a hearing, the court adjudicated Defendant delinquent and ordered him committed to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for a period not to exceed one year. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit set aside the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition order on grounds that "any rational trier of fact, after viewing all of the evidence favorably to the prosecution, must have a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt." The Supreme Court granted the state's application for review and reversed the decision because the court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation of the evidence presented at the delinquency hearing for that of the fact finder. View "In the interest of C.D." on Justia Law

During its 2010 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 749 (Act), comprising La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041 through 17:4049, known as the "Red Tape Reduction and Local Empowerment Waiver Program." The Act authorized the Board of Secondary and Elementary Education ("BESE") to grant waivers exempting school districts and individual schools from complying with a number of statutes provided for in Title 17, the Education Code. Under the Act, a waiver could not be presented to BESE "unless a majority of the classroom teachers employed in the school, voting by secret ballot, vote in favor of inclusion of such school in the waiver request." At this point, no waiver had been granted under the Act, or even requested. The Louisiana Federation of Teachers and others (collectively "LFT") filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State of Louisiana and BESE, seeking a judgment declaring Act 749 unconstitutional. In particular, LFT sought to enjoin Defendants from applying and enforcing La. Rev. Stat. 17:4041(7). Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded that the constitutional challenge presented in this case was premature and presented no justiciable controversy. Therefore the Court reversed the ruling of the trial court which held Act 749 unconstitutional. View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

The state charged Defendant Mary Trahan by grand jury indictment with second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1 following the shooting death of her live-in boyfriend/husband. After trial by jury, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence on grounds that the evidence presented at trial did not support her conviction for second degree murder and would not support a judgment of guilt on the lesser included and responsive offenses of manslaughter and negligent homicide. The court of appeal accordingly ordered Defendant acquitted. The Supreme Court granted the state's application for review and reversed the decision below: "[j]urors were . . . entitled at the close of evidence to hold the defense accountable for its failure to introduce any evidence in support of the hypothesis of innocence proposed by defense counsel. . . It clearly appears that jurors reasonably rejected the hypothesis of innocence proposed by the defense which produced no evidence in support of it. " The Court reinstated Defendant's conviction for second degree murder and life sentence, and remanded the case back to the district court for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Trahan" on Justia Law

Claimant Henry Marange filed a disputed claim for compensation against his employer, Custom Metal Fabricators, Inc. asserting he injured his back in a work-related accident. Custom Metal answered the petition, and denied Claimant's allegation. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held that Claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a workplace accident occurred. Upon review of the facts in record, the Court concluded that the court of appeal erred in reversing the OWC's judgment. View "Marange v. Custom Metal Fabricators, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant James Mercer, was injured in an accident during his employment with Defendant, Nabors Drilling, USA, L.P. Claimant received workers' compensation disability and medical benefits. As a result of his accident, Claimant also filed suit against a third-party tortfeasor. Nabors intervened, seeking recovery of the workers' compensation benefits it paid to claimant. Without prior approval by Nabors, Claimant settled the tort suit with the third-party tortfeasor for an amount in excess of the workers' compensation benefits paid by Nabors. Subsequently, Claimant reimbursed Nabors for the full amount of workers' compensation benefits paid, deducting a proportionate share for attorney fees and costs. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether whether the court of appeal erred in reversing a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which held the employer was entitled to a credit against future medical benefits. Upon review, the Court concluded that OWC correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, and therefore reinstated the OWC's judgment. View "Mercer v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP" on Justia Law

In 2008, Petitioner Peter Vizzi, M.D. filed an open account against the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (LCG) for expenses incurred following his treatment of Quinton Contrell Sam. Sam allegedly committed armed robbery in early 2008. He fled the scene of the crime on foot and forced his way into a private residence. When police arrived on the scene, they arrested Sam. Sam was taken by ambulance to Lafayette General Medical center where he was treated for a gunshot wound. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to interpret the meaning of La. R.S. 15:304 to determine whether Dr. Vizzi was legally entitled to recover the expenses he incurred for treatment of Sam. After review of the record, the Court concluded the lower courts erred by holding that LCG was liable for the expenses: LCG argued that the expenses were not caused by the arrest, but were merely the result of an injury prior to the arrest, and therefore, La. R.S. 15:304 was inapplicable. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the lower courts' holdings. View "Peter D. Vizzi, M.D. v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government" on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiff Tanya Lato Ponceti, and her seven-year-old daughter, Kaitlynn, lived in The Woodlands, an apartment complex in Mandeville, Louisiana owned by First Lake Properties, Inc. While Kaitlynn was riding her self-propelled scooter in the courtyard of the apartment complex, an unidentified teenager on a bicycle "popped a wheelie," and ultimately lost control of his bicycle. The bicycle then landed on Kaitlynn's leg, causing her injury. As a result, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Kaitlynn, filed suit against First Lake. Plaintiff alleged First Lake was negligent in allowing persons to ride bicycles on the sidewalks of the apartment complex, in violation of a Mandeville City Ordinance. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether First Lake was entitled to summary judgment, on the ground it had no duty to protect residents from injury resulting from persons riding bicycles on the sidewalks of the complex. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the owner had no duty to plaintiffs and therefore granted summary judgment in its favor. View "Poncetti v. First Lake Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment. That judgment confirmed and quieted title to a tax purchaser on the basis that the former property owner failed to file a separate action or reconventional demand to institute a proceeding to annul the tax sale within six months from the date of service of the petition and citation to quiet title. Upon review, the Court concluded the former property owner's claim that the tax sale was null and void was timely made and the former property owner had sufficiently established that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the sheriff provided notice of the tax delinquencies and the tax sale to the record property owner as required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (failure of which would have rendered the tax sales entirely null and void). Accordingly, the Court found summary judgment to quiet tax titles in favor of the tax purchaser was not warranted in this case. View "Smithko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc." on Justia Law