Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On May 29, 2009, Plaintiff Rose McCann filed a petition for divorce against Defendant Walter McCann in the Family Court. A judgment granting the divorce was later signed in early, 2010, leaving the identification, valuation, management, and partition of the community property as the remaining issues in the case. Plaintiff filed a petition for partition of community property, moving the court to appoint various experts to assist in the partition. The Family Court appointed real estate and financial experts to inventory and value the real estate, and determine the value of the remaining property. Thereafter, a “Notice of Filing of Succession” was filed, stating that Defendant's succession had been opened in the District Court under Probate. Plaintiff filed a motion to substitute the succession executrix the decedent's daughter, as the party defendant in the partition proceeding. The succession executrix filed a “Declinatory Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer,” seeking to have the partition action transferred to the District Court. The Family Court overruled the exception, denied the motion to transfer, and signed a judgment substituting the executrix into the partition action as the defendant, in place of the deceased Defendant. The executrix unsuccessfully appealed the Family Court's decision. The Supreme Court granted Defendant executrix’s writ application and remanded the matter to the appellate court for briefing, argument and full opinion. On remand, the appellate court by a majority decision again denied the executrix' writ application. The issue now before the Supreme Court was the correctness of the lower courts’ rulings. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Family Court no longer had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the partition of community property when one of the former spouses died. Thus, the Family Court erred in overruling the Defendant executrix’s exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "McCann v. McCann" on Justia Law

Defendant Larry Thompson was charged by bill of information with possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Substance (cocaine). Defendant claimed to be visiting his girlfriend and a friend at a motel, and encountered police executing search warrants for two motel rooms. While being questioned by the officers, Defendant admitted he had been previously convicted of a felony and stated he possessed both a gun and crack cocaine in his truck, parked nearby in the motel’s parking lot. He gave officers permission to search his truck, both verbally and on a written consent form. He then recovered rocks of crack cocaine from the truck and gave them to the officers. During pretrial discovery, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming the consent to search was the product of an illegal detention. After its review of the facts and legal conclusions found by the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court of appeal’s decision to the contrary was reversed, the ruling of the trial court is reinstated, and the case was remanded to the court of appeal for its review of the remaining assignment of error raised by Defendant on appeal. View "Louisiana v. Thompson" on Justia Law

"This matter has a complicated and convoluted procedural history, which has ultimately resulted in a 'cobweb of litigation.'" This case has its genesis in 1994 when ANR Pipeline Company (ANR) first challenged the ad valorem taxes assessed against its public service pipelines by filing a protest with the Louisiana Tax Commission (LTC). Thereafter, through 2003, ANR filed annual protests with the LTC. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) and Southern Natural Gas Company (SNG) also filed protests with the LTC regarding the ad valorem taxes assessed against their public service pipelines from 2000 to 2003.The issues before the Supreme Court concerned whether the reassessment of public service properties issued on remand of this matter in accordance with a court order constituted a local assessment by the local assessors or a central assessment by the Louisiana Tax Commission (LTC) and whether, in this taxpayers’ action, the assessors have a right to challenge a decision of the LTC relative to those reassessment valuations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the reassessments were central assessments governed by the provisions of La. Const. art. VII, sec. 18 and La. R.S. 47:1851, et seq. Furthermore, the Court found that once joined by the taxpayers as defendants in the taxpayers’ Section 1856 action for judicial review, the assessors are entitled to challenge the LTC’s final determination of the reassessment valuations. Accordingly, the Court found the lower courts erred in sustaining the taxpayers’ exceptions of no right of action and dismissing the assessors’ cross-appeals. View "ANR Pipeline Co v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant Rudy Trosclair pled guilty to sexual battery of a child under thirteen years of age, for which he was sentenced to serve thirty months imprisonment at hard labor "without benefit." Shortly after his incarceration, La. Rev. Stat. sec. 15:561.2 was amended to provide for lifetime supervision. Upon his release from custody, Defendant was placed under lifelong supervision in accordance with the amended provision. Defendant then filed a motion in the district court challenging the retroactive application of the amendment as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court denied the motion, but the court of appeal granted writs and found the amendment increased the penalty for the offense and could, therefore, not be applied retroactively to the defendant. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, after first converting this appeal to an application for supervisory writs, the Court concluded the amended supervised release provisions were predominantly nonpunitive in both intent and effect, and therefore, their retroactive application to this Defendant did not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the Court granted the State’s application and reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. View "Louisiana v. Trosclair" on Justia Law

In March 2007, Plaintiff Joseph Trascher filed a petition in the district court seeking an ex parte order to perpetuate his testimony, alleging that he had been diagnosed with asbestosis in August 2006, and that it was unlikely that he would survive more than another six months. Plaintiff also alleged he sustained occupational exposures to asbestos while working as a tack welder at the Avondale Shipyard from 1960 to 1964, and at the Equitable Shipyard from 1965-1974. He requested service on these parties and a number of other parties he identified as expected defendants in his anticipated suit for damages.The district court granted the ex parte order and the videotaped perpetuation deposition was scheduled for April 3, 2007, at Plaintiff's home. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court concerned the admissibility of the video deposition where the deposition was halted due to the deponent’s failing health and fatigue, and the deponent died before his deposition could be continued and before he could be cross-examined by opposing counsel. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court found that while most of the video deposition was inadmissible, parts of the deposition were admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. View "Trascher v. Territo" on Justia Law

In 2006, an ambulance belonging to Advanced Emergency Medical Services, Inc. (“Advanced”) was traveling southbound on Louisiana Highway 23, a four-lane highway in Plaquemines Parish. Due to transmission problems, the ambulance became disabled, and was parked on the shoulder of the highway. Later that evening, Plaintiff Jeryd Zito was driving southbound in the right-hand lane of Highway 23 in his pickup truck. He struck the left rear corner and left side of the ambulance. Plaintiff filed suit against Advanced and its insurer, Empire Indemnity Insurance Company. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred in assessing 100% of the fault to Advanced (and Empire) for the accident. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's factual findings were manifestly erroneous, and therefore reversed the court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Zito v. Advanced Emergency Medical Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits. View "Clay v. Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the doctrine of "contra non valentem" applied to suspend a ten year liberative prescriptive period applicable to an action by a mineral interest owner against the operator of a unit well who failed to pay the owner share of the proceeds for mineral production. Plaintiff James Wells filed suit after being contacted by a landman concerning leasing of his mineral interest in lands inherited from his parents. In the 1950s, Plaintiff's parents sold the land but reserved the mineral interests. Plaintiff's mother executed a mineral lease which was released a few years later because the well drilled resulted in a dry hole. However, the landowners executed their own mineral lease, which achieved production in 1965, and continued producing until 2007. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Donald Zadeck and Zadeck Energy Group and several other companies who were allegedly conducting oil and gas exploration and production activities from his unleased unitized acreage without tendering to him (or his parents) their rightful share of proceeds from the production. In response, Zadeck filed a Peremptory Exception of Prescription, urging that Plaintiff's claim to recover payments was a quasi contract that prescribed ten years from Zadeck's successor's cessation of involvement with the "dry hole." Plaintiff argued that the doctrine of "contra non valentem" applied to suspend the running of prescription since he had no knowledge of the existence of the mineral interests or production until December 2008. Plaintiff contended that his ignorance was not attributable to any fault of his own, and he clearly exercised due diligence in discovering the relevant facts once he learned from the landman that he owned the mineral interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the doctrine of contra non valentem applied to suspend the running of prescription because the mineral interest owners did not know nor reasonably should they have known of the mineral production until December 2008. View "Wells v. Zadeck Energy Group" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant-Respondent Aubrey Brown by bill of information with one count of simple burglary of a religious building, and one count of simple burglary. The two crimes were apparently unrelated and the State ultimately severed the second count before bringing Defendant to trial. A jury convicted Defendant by a non-unanimous vote. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On appeal, the First Circuit noted Defendant's conviction stemmed from a proceeding in which a six-person jury offense had been mistakenly tried in a 12-person jury. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed his conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's judgment, finding that Defendant acquiesced to the error by actively participating the selection of the jury without objection at any stage of the proceedings, and thereby waived any relief on appeal on grounds that the panel selected was composed of a greater number of jurors than required by law. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Louisiana v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a "statement made or action taken" language in La. R.S. 17:439(A) precludes a cause of action against school employees for negligent acts of omission and to ascertain whether an action may be filed pursuant to La. R.S. 17:439(D) directly against a school employee for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle to the extent his or her liability is covered by insurance or self-insurance. Nakisha Credit, mother of Adrianne Breana Howard (Breana), sued on behalf of Breana's half-siblings and herself stemming from a fight Breana had on school grounds. Breana was involved in "an ongoing feud" with Courtney McClain. Breana was dropped off in the rear of Rayville High School after school had been dismissed for the day at Richland Career Center and began to walk home. Plaintiffs contend LeBaron Sledge instigated a fight between Breana and Courtney whereby the two girls began fighting on the sidewalk in the rear of the school. During the altercation, Breana was either pushed by Courtney or fell off the sidewalk, and was struck by an oncoming Richland Parish school bus. Breana died as a result of her injuries. Among other allegations, Plaintiffs' petition alleged Defendants the School District, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the school board's insurer, the school superintendent and the bus driver were negligent in a variety of ways by failing to supervise the children, failing to timely respond to the fight, and failing to adequately staff the bus area with teachers or school employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to hold that La. R.S. 17:439(A) precludes a cause of action against school employees for certain negligent acts, including acts of commission and acts of omission. The Court otherwise affirmed the court of appeal's ruling that La. R.S. 17:439(D) permits an action directly against a school bus driver for the negligent operation of a school bus to the extent the driver’s liability is covered by insurance or self-insurance. View "Credit v. Richland Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law