Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

As a consequence of a June 2006 storm, the stormwater drainage and storage system (including the wastewater treatment facility) at the Lake Charles refinery of Defendant CITGO Petroleum Company (CITGO), was filled beyond available capacity and overflowed, resulting in a major oil spill. Over 21 million gallons of waste, including 17 million gallons of contaminated wastewater and 4.2 million gallons of slop oil, escaped from the two existing wastewater storage tanks into an area around the tanks which was surrounded by levees or dikes. The oil spill, which was described at trial as "major" and "catastrophic," eventually contaminated over 100 miles of shoreline along the Calcasieu River, and required several months to clean up. Fourteen plaintiffs, employees of Ron Williams Construction (RWC) working at the Calcasieu Refining Company (CRC) south of the CITGO refinery, filed suit against CITGO and R&R Construction, Inc. (R&R) alleging various injuries due to their exposure to noxious gases emanating from the spill. CITGO and R&R stipulated that they were liable for the spill and agreed to pay plaintiffs for all their compensatory damages assessed to CITGO and R&R. After a two week bench trial, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had proved their injuries were caused by CITGO's admitted negligence in allowing the spill. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the district court's finding the spill caused plaintiffs' injuries was not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted review of this case to determine whether the courts below erred as to the allocation of fault, in awarding damages for fear of future injury, and in awarding punitive damages. In sum, the Court held that Louisiana's conflict of laws statutes did not provide for the application of the punitive damages laws of Texas or Oklahoma under the facts of this case, that plaintiffs proved that their damages were caused by their exposure to toxic chemicals contained in the oil spill, that plaintiffs are entitled to damages for fear of contracting cancer, and that CITGO did not produce at the hearing on summary judgment factual support sufficient to establish that it would be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial. The Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

In what the state termed as "particularly egregious and predatory acts of contractor fraud in New Orleans" following Hurricane Katrina, 63-year-old Defendant-Respondent John Colvin, a former elected state representative in Alabama, entered guilty pleas in November 2009, to six counts of felony theft. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and in 2010, conducted a sentencing hearing at which the victims on each count or members of their family, testified about their losses. The defense called several witnesses in mitigation. At the close of the hearing, the trial court sentenced respondent on each count to consecutive terms of 10 years imprisonment at hard labor, for a total of 60 years imprisonment at hard labor. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated his sentences as excessive and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. The Supreme Court granted the State's request to review the Fourth Circuit's decision and reversed, finding that given the circumstances in this case, there was no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the sentences by the trial court were reinstated, and the case was remanded for execution of sentence. View "Louisiana v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Defendants Glen Dale Nelson and Melvin Goldman were convicted by jury of one count of illegal use of weapons, four counts of armed robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Both received substantial sentences as habitual offenders. Defendants appealed their convictions, asserting the trial court's handling of jury selection, specifically its handling of a "reverse-Batson" challenge by the State were all in error. Finding no error by the trial court, the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' writ applications to review the correctness of the court of appeal's decision. The sole issue was the reverse-Batson issue. In total, seventeen of the eighteen peremptory challenges exercised by Defendants were used to excuse white prospective jurors. The State used seven out of ten peremptory challenges to remove prospective black jurors. With a venire that was approximately thirty-three percent black, the eight jurors provisionally selected at that time were evenly divided along racial lines. The State urged a reverse-Batson objection, arguing that defense counsel had used their peremptory challenges to exclude white prospective jurors. The State further argued that because defense counsel conferred before striking prospective jurors, the court should consider their peremptory usage together for purposes of Batson. Upon review, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, finding the trial court erred both in its application of Batson, and in formulating a remedy for the alleged Batson violation. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, vacated the convictions and sentences, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Louisiana v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted consolidated writ applications to address the majority opinion of the court of appeal which held the medical malpractice cap enunciated in La.R.S. 40:1299.42(B) was unconstitutional "to the extent it includes nurse practitioners within its ambit.” The Court reiterated its holding in "Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hospital of Dillard University," (508 U.S. 909 (1993)), which found the cap constitutional. Finding the cap to be applicable to all qualified healthcare providers under the Medical Malpractice Act, including nurse practitioners, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal in this respect. Additionally, the Court addressed two other assignments of error asserted by the Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund and affirmed those portions of the court of appeal judgment. The effect of the Court's holding was to reinstate the trial court judgment in full. View "Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a dispute as to the proper application of La. Const. art. I, sec. 17 as applied to this case. Specifically, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant loses the right to waive a trial by jury when the initial trial date was set within forty-five days of a pretrial proceeding and the district court indicated to the defendant a waiver was permissible. Defendant Gerald Chinn was charged by bill of information with three counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated criminal damage to property. Following a series of preliminary motions, a status conference was convened, and at that time, the State requested that the trial be set for a date forty-three days away. Defense counsel agreed to the trial date with the caveat that her client be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury. Following a brief colloquy with the defendant, the district court accepted the defendant’s jury-trial waiver, but the State objected. Finding that the court of appeal erred in ruling the defendant should not be allowed to waive his right to trial by jury under the unique facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the ruling of the district court permitting the defendant to waive his right to trial by jury. View "Louisiana v. Chinn" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, which recommended Justice of the Peace Herbert Williams (Parish of Plaquemines) be publicly censured and ordered to reimburse costs incurred in the Commission's investigation and prosecution of this case for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In his capacity as an ex officio notary public, JP Williams notarized a document "purporting to transfer" ownership of a parcel of land to his son and daughter-in-law. The donation was not recorded right away. Upon discovering the "purported donation" in 2009, the purported Donor filed a complaint in Louisiana federal district court to clear title to the property at issue. In light of an article that appeared in the local newspaper concerning the complaint, the Commission opened an investigation, and alleged JP Williams engaged in judicial misconduct by notarizing the donation of land to his relatives, which was beyond his limited ex officio notarial powers, and without witnessing the Donor's signature. After a thorough review of the facts and law in this matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission's disciplinary recommendation. View "In re JP Williams, Jr." on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on recommendation of the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana, which recommended District Judge Robert Burgess (of the 42nd Judicial District, Parish of DeSoto) be publicly censured for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The disciplinary proceedings arose from a divorce proceeding between Tad Russell VanZile and Judge Burgess' niece, Jenifer Colvin VanZile. The Judge intervened in his niece's divorce and restraining order proceedings by phoning other judges as to the status and disposition of his niece's case. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the Judiciary Commission and publicly censured Judge Burgess, and ordered him to pay costs. View "In re Burgess" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Dr. Kaleem and Nadeem Arshad initially requested a jury trial in their petition for damages. Shortly before trial, they filed a motion to strike the jury. In response, Defendant City of Kenner enacted a resolution waiving the prohibition against jury trials in this specific case and filed a request for a jury trial. The District Court granted the City's request, finding La. Rev. Stat. 13:5105(D) permitted a political subdivision to waive the prohibition against jury trials on a case-by-case basis. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the City's resolution was a prohibited special law because it waived the prohibition against jury trials only in this single case. The Supreme Court granted writs to address the correctness vel non of the appellate court's decision. The Court concluded that the plain language of La. Rev. Stat. 13:5105(D) did not permit a political subdivision to waive the prohibition against jury trials in a single case. The Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Arshad v. City of Kenner" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case arose in connection with a motion to rank creditors in a suit for executory process. DDS Construction, LLC developed a subdivision in Reserve. To fund that development, DDS obtained various loans from First National Bank. To secure its repayment of those loans, DDS granted First National a "Multiple Indebtedness Mortgage" over individual lots located in the subdivision. One property, Lot 8 Square A, was at the center of this controversy. The district court held a notarial act which cancelled the lot's mortgage could be corrected by an act of correction under La. R.S. 35:2.1 and First National, the lender which erroneously cancelled the mortgage, maintained its rank relative to a subsequent mortgage under the statute's provisions. The court of appeal disagreed, holding that under these facts the subsequent mortgage primed the mortgage by the First National, which must be ranked as of the time of the act of correction. After review, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal erred and reversed, reinstating the ruling of the district court. View "First National Bank v. DDS Construction" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff Laurie Jenkins entered into a contract with Chet Medlock for the sale, transfer and delivery of a metal building. The purchase price was to be paid in three equal installments. After the building was completed, issues arose regarding the quality of work. Plaintiff contacted Defendant Larry Starns who wrote a letter to Medlock on her behalf, pointing out several complaints Plaintiff had with the building. Medlock sued Plaintiff for breach of contract; she was personally served. Defendant was in contact with Medlock's attorney, and believed there was an informal agreement for an extension of time to file responsive pleadings. When no answer was filed, Medlock obtained a default judgment against Plaintiff. Plaintiff notified Defendant of the judgment, to which he filed a petition to annul the judgment. Medlock responded arguing insufficiency of service and improper venue. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant made an appearance at court. The trial court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff's suit. Ultimately the court issued a judgment of garnishment against Plaintiff's bank account. Plaintiff filed suit against her attorney alleging legal malpractice, which she lost. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court and court of appeal erred in applying the "continuous representation rule" to suspend the commencement of the one-year peremptive period in La. R.S. 9:5605 until Defendant's efforts to remedy his negligence had concluded. The court of appeal's judgment was reversed. View "Jenkins v. Starns" on Justia Law