Justia Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lake Charles Rubber and Gasket Co., L.L.C. ("Lake") and its sole owner, Vesta Balay Johnston (collectively, Plaintiffs), and Gulf Coast Rubber and Gasket, L.L.C. ("Gulf') and Bryan Vincent (collectively, Defendants), both appealed certain court of appeal rulings. Defendants asserted the court of appeal failed to correctly apply the manifest error standard of review in reversing the district court's findings that certain Lake information in Gulf's possession did not constitute "trade secrets" or that their misappropriation was not otherwise a violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Secrets Act ("LUTSA"). They further argued the court of appeal erred in increasing the damages award from $700,000 to $19,574,884, i.e., a multiple of nearly 28, where ample evidence in the record supported the district court's judgment as to damages. Plaintiffs argued the court of appeal erred on rehearing by eliminating the treble damages applied to its award for unjust enrichment and dismissing Johnston's claim for diminution in value of her ownership interest in Lake. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal in part as to its finding that Lake's parts numbering system and descriptions constituted a trade secret under LUTSA. Furthermore, the Court reversed the court of appeal as to the increase in the amount of lost profit damages. The case was remanded to the district court for a recalculation of lost profit damages giving consideration to the violations of LUTSA related to Gulf's misappropriation of Lake's customer lists and inventory usage history with respect to the Sasol customer contract. The Court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson, et al. v. Vincent, et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose from a 2006 class action suit instituted by Steve Crooks and Era Lee Crooks (“Class Plaintiffs”) against the State through the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“LDNR”) concerning the ownership of riverbanks in the Catahoula Basin and subsequent mineral royalty payments. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to address whether mandamus may lie to compel the State to pay a judgment rendered against it for mineral royalty payments. Finding that the payment of a judgment concerning the return of mineral royalties received by the State required legislative appropriation, an act that is discretionary in nature, the appellate court erred in issuing the writ of mandamus. View "Crooks, et al. v. Louisiana, Dept. of Nat. Resources" on Justia Law

The Pineville City Court was fully funded by the City of Pineville. This funding included amounts for the salaries of three clerk positions and accompanying human resources services. In turn, the City Court reimbursed the City for forty-percent of those expenses. In November 2020, the Pineville City Court informed the City that it would no longer reimburse the forty- percent as it had done in the past. Thereafter, the City sent notice that it would reduce payments of the clerks’ salaries by forty-percent, cease providing payroll and human resources services, pay only sixty-percent of the clerks’ retirement contributions, and discontinue the clerks’ participation in the city’s Blue Cross health plan. In this mandamus action the issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment that granted the City's exception of no cause of action. The plain language of La. R.S. 13:1888 A mandated only a minimum salary amount that must be paid to the city court clerk and deputy clerks. "The governing authorities have discretion to pay more than the mandated minimum salary. A mandamus action is an incorrect vehicle for the demand asserted by Pineville City Court because the underlying duty is not purely ministerial in nature." Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly granted the exception of no cause of action. View "Pineville City Court, et al. v. City of Pineville, et al." on Justia Law

In 2020, an accident, fire, and explosion occurred in the hydrocracker unit at a Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC refinery in Meraux, Louisiana. No significant levels of chemicals were detected as a result of the explosion. Multiple residents in the vicinity of the refinery filed suit for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff Brittany Spencer and her two minor children, Chloe LaFrance and Lanny LaFrance III, were at home sleeping when the explosion occurred. Their residence was approximately 2,000 feet from the epicenter of the explosion. Spencer and Chloe were unexpectedly awakened by a loud sound of unknown origin and a significant shockwave and vibration of unknown origin. Lanny was not awakened. The sound and/or shockwave shook Spencer’s bedroom window. Spencer went outside and observed a large flame of the fire coming from the refinery, and the sky was lit up. Almost immediately after the explosion, Spencer began to hear police vehicles, fire trucks, and ambulances as part of the emergency response that lasted for several hours. Spencer went back inside, and she and Chloe went back to sleep. On the morning of the explosion, Spencer and her children left their residence out of an abundance of caution and did not return until two days later. Spencer eventually returned to her normal sleep schedule, albeit with some trouble; she did not allow her children to play outside due to concerns for their safety. Thereafter, Spencer and her children began staying at their residence less and later moved away from the refinery in June 2020. Spencer, individually and on behalf of her minor children, and Lanny LaFrance, Jr. on behalf of his minor children, filed suit against Valero alleging damages for emotional distress, but did not allege physical injury, property damage, or financial loss. Valero appealed when a trial court awarded damages to plaintiffs for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no Plaintiff met their burden of proving they were entitled to such an award, and reversed the trial court. View "Spencer v. Valero Refining Meraux, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute regarding the excavation of lots located in the The Grove Subdivision between plaintiff Hidden Grove LLC (“Hidden Grove”), the developer of The Grove, and homeowner defendants Richard and Lisa Brauns (the Braunses). In 2011, the Braunses purchased a home located on Lot 14 of The Grove from a third party not involved in this litigation. The next day, the Braunses purchased Lot 15 from Hidden Grove for $100,000. They also acquired a right of first refusal to purchase Lots 16 and 17. The surface elevations of Lots 16 and 17 were eight feet higher than that of Lot 15. Because the Braunses intended to add on to their home and build a swimming pool on Lot 15, they sought to lower the elevation of Lots 16 and 17 to match the elevation of the lots previously purchased. Hidden Grove agreed the Braunses could lower the elevation of Lots 16 and 17, at their own expense. Before the parties executed a written agreement setting forth the engineering specifications for the excavation, work began in January 2013 on oral permission of Hidden Grove. In June 2013, after the excavation was near completion, disputes arose between the parties, specifically as to whether the Braunses were required to extend the retaining wall onto Lots 16 and 17. When Richard Brauns told Hidden Grove that the wall would terminate at the boundary of Lot 15 and 16, Hidden Grove ordered the Braunses to stop work and “get off the property.” Hidden Grove filed suit against the Braunses alleging breach of contract and requesting specific performance of concluding the excavation and construction of a retaining wall through the backs of Lots 16 and 17. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this matter to review the court of appeal’s determination that Hidden Grove could not assert a claim for enrichment without cause under Civil Code article 2298 for failure to establish the “no other remedy at law” element of the claim. The Court concluded the court of appeal erred and remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of pretermitted issues. View "Hidden Grove, LLC v. Brauns" on Justia Law

This dispute over UM coverage arose from a motor vehicle accident wherein an uninsured motorist struck and killed Macy Lee Alvey, III, who was in the course and scope of his employment with Rony’s Towing & Recovery, LLC (“Rony’s Towing”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ to determine whether the failure to include the insurer’s name on an uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage selection form rendered it invalid. Because inclusion of the insurer’s name was an express requirement on the face of the UM form itself, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal that the failure to include such information resulted in an invalid waiver of coverage. View "Berkeley Assurance Co. v. Willis, et al." on Justia Law

This consolidated matter arose from a class action for damages filed by Louisiana health care providers for alleged violations of the Preferred Provider Organizations (“PPO”) statute. La. R.S. 40:2201, et seq. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to interpret the statute and to determine whether defendant, Stratacare, Inc. (“Stratacare”), was a “group purchaser” subject to penalties for violating the mandatory notice provision of the statute. After a review of the record and the law, the Supreme Court concluded that Stratacare was not a group purchaser as contemplated by the statute. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeal, vacated the lower court judgments, and dismissed the case. View "Williams, et al. v. Bestcomp, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

The property at issue was part of a larger tract purchased by Clarence Saloom in 1953 during his marriage to Pauline Womac Saloom. The entire tract was about 80 acres and became known as the “Pine Farm.” Plaintiffs were Clarence and Pauline’s three children: Patricia Saloom, Clarence Saloom Jr., and Daniel Saloom. Pauline died in 1973, and her one-half community interest in the Pine Farm was inherited by plaintiffs. A judgment of possession recognizing them as owners of Pauline’s one-half interest in the Pine Farm, subject to a usufruct in Clarence’s favor, was signed in 1974, and recorded in the public land records of Lafayette Parish. About two years later, the Louisiana Department of Highways (now the Department of Transportation and Development (the “state”)), contacted Clarence about purchasing a piece of the Pine Farm in connection with a project to widen and improve La. Highway 339. The instrument identifies Clarence as “husband of Pauline Womac Saloom” but does not mention Pauline’s death or plaintiffs’ inheritance of her interest in the property. Plaintiffs are not identified in the act of sale, did not sign it, and apparently were unaware of it for several years. In 1985, after learning of their father’s 1976 conveyance, plaintiffs hired an attorney who informed the state that plaintiffs owned an undivided one-half interest in the property. In 2015, about twenty years after Clarence’s death, the state began constructing improvements to Highway 339 on the property. Plaintiffs again contacted the state. In a May 18, 2016 letter, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed the same information he had relayed to the state over thirty years earlier, specifically the state did not purchase all of the property in 1976 because Clarence only owned an undivided one-half interest. The state claimed to have acquired all interests in the property at issue and declined payment for plaintiffs' interest. Plaintiffs thereafter filed suit seeking damages for inverse condemnation. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal judgment reversing the trial court’s judgment and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment was vacated. Because the court of appeal did not consider the state’s remaining arguments in support of its motion and in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the case was remanded the matter to the court of appeal for consideration of the state’s remaining assignments of error. View "Saloom v. Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev." on Justia Law

Defendant Qwandarious Rowe was charged by bill of information with possession of methamphetamine (less than two grams). The incident giving rise to defendant’s arrest occurred at a Washington Parish fair: a fair attendee alerted a sheriff’s deputy that a man in a public bathroom was sitting on the floor with his pants around his ankles. As the deputy pulled up defendant’s pants and assisted him out of the bathroom, he felt a syringe in defendant’s pocket, which he seized. The sergeant felt defendant required medical evaluation, and the fair’s emergency medical service (EMS) team was called. Defendant was carted off by gold cart for observation. Before the cart took defendant away, the deputy noticed something he believed to be methamphetamine sticking out of defendant's sock. Ultimately, EMS transported defendant by ambulance to a hospital where he was admitted with an altered mental status and was diagnosed with psychoactive substance abuse and an unspecified psychoactive substance abuse disorder. He was discharged about two-and-a-half hours later. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to clarify the application of La.R.S. 14:403.10(B), which shielded a person from prosecution of possession of a controlled dangerous substance if it is discovered while that person is receiving needed medical assistance as a result of a “drug-related overdose.” The Court found that for the purpose of applying La.R.S. 14:403.10, “overdose” meant an acute medical condition, including, but not limited to, extreme physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory depression, coma, mania, hysteria, or death that is the result of consumption or use of a controlled dangerous substance, or a condition a lay person would reasonably believe was a drug-related overdose. The trial court here "manifestly erred" in rejecting defendant’s claim of immunity from prosecution under La.R.S. 14:403.10. Defendant presented sufficient evidence that he was, in fact, experiencing a drug-related overdose and, furthermore, his condition was such that a lay person would reasonably believe he was experiencing a drug-related overdose. Accordingly, the lower courts’ rulings were reversed, and defendant’s motion to quash was granted. View "Louisiana v. Rowe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Walter George was standing at the roadside of his home in Houma, Louisiana, at the same time defendant Progressive Waste Solutions of La., Inc. (“Progressive”) was picking up garbage on plaintiff’s street. While plaintiff was picking remnants of garbage left behind, he was struck by the hydraulic arm of a garbage truck and sustained injuries. Plaintiff and his wife Janie petitioned for damages against Progressive and ABC Insurance Company. Champion Medical Center entered into a “Professional Service Agreement” (“agreement”) with Ascendant Healthcare (“company”), which identified itself in this agreement as being in “the business of arranging for the provision of professional medical services to persons whose health care costs are paid by liability insurance companies and/or attorneys that enter into arrangements with [Ascendant] for the provision of such services....” The agreement also stated that “[p]rovider agrees and hereby appoints Company as its agent for purposes of filing a medical lien for the services rendered by Provider. Plaintiff’s former counsel at the law firm of Spagnoletti & Company executed a “Letter of Guaranty and Protection.” The document, signed by Marcus Spagnoletti only, identified “the undersigned attorney and law firm” as the “GUARANTOR,” “ASCENDANT HEALTHCARE, LLC” as the “Company,” and the patient as Walter George (who received medical treatment resulting from an “ACCIDENT” in 2015). After the parties engaged in initial discovery, defendant Progressive filed a Motion in Limine on March 10, 2020, seeking to exclude or strike the medical bills related to plaintiff’s surgery and charged to Ascendant Healthcare. Defendant asserted the collateral source rule did not apply for these charges because they were "simply amounts charged," and plaintiff has not diminished his patrimony in order to receive his medical care. The motion was ultimately granted, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. "In the absence of any evidence that plaintiff is not liable for the full billed medical charges in this matter, defendant cannot benefit from any reduction as a result of the subject medical factoring agreement." The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "George v. Progressive Waste Solutions of Louisiana, et al." on Justia Law